Authoritarianism and Judicial Efforts for Securing Autonomy: A Case Study of Pakistan

Abstract

In a democratic system of government, state affairs are divided into legislative, executive, and judiciary. In Pakistan’s democratic transition, military role as an additional unavoidable stakeholder cannot be neglected. Pakistan remained under despotic regime for more than three decades with judicial backing by validating extraconstitutional acts. However, this autocratic rule never remained absolute and unchallenged. With qualitative research methodology this article examined how judiciary validated extraconstitutional acts at the expense of civilian governments and compromised its autonomy. How military role in democratic transition is minimized through parliamentary and judicial efforts. The research at hand aimed to investigate how military and its affiliates entrenched its authority during its direct rule and how it transformed and preserved that authority during civilian rule. How judiciary challenged and circumscribed unbridled military rule while securing its autonomy. This paper also explicated potential risk of confrontation between parliament and judiciary where the latter remained absolute autonomous. In order to overcome prospects of potential confrontation, this research suggested judicial realization of self-restraints so as to avoid unnecessary intrusion that could result into interbranch conflicts.