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<b>Article:</b>	<b>Framing Strategies for the Populist Coverage: Exploring Press of India and Pakistan</b>
<b>Author(s):</b>	Anbreen Waheed PhD scholar, Department of Media Studies, Bahria university, islamabad. Lecturer Media & communication Studies, NUML, Rawalpindi
	Dr. Shabir Hussain Professor, Department of Media Studies, Bahria university, Islamabad
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<b>Author(s) Note:</b>	Anbreen Waheed is a PhD scholar at Department of Media Studies, Bahria university, Islamabad & serving as a Lecturer Media & communication Studies, NUML, Rawalpindi Email: <a href="mailto:amwaheed@numl.edu.pk">amwaheed@numl.edu.pk</a>
	Dr. Shabir Hussain is serving as a Professor at Department of Media Studies, Bahria university, Islamabad

**ABSTRACT**

This research paper examines the framing of political news coverage in Pakistan and India, focusing on the prominent English-language newspapers Dawn and The Hindu, respectively. Utilizing content analysis of news spanning pre-election and post-election periods, the study reveals significant variations in framing strategies employed by the two newspapers. Dawn exhibits a notable emphasis on anti-elite frames, particularly during electoral phases, while allocating comparatively fewer news stories to people-centric framing. In contrast, The Hindu demonstrates a more consistent approach, The distribution of coverage differs, with Pakistan showing heightened scrutiny of political conduct prior to elections and increased focus on Government Execution in post-election. Furthermore, there is a noticeable shift towards negative tone in post-election coverage, reflecting public expectations for accountability and governance effectiveness. These findings underscore the dynamic nature of press coverage in shaping public discourse and highlight the evolving priorities and concerns within the political landscapes of Pakistan and India.

**Keywords:** Populism, Framing Strategies, populist leaders, General Election India, General Election Pakistan,

## **1. Introduction**

The rising popularity of several Western democracies in recent years has made populism a well-known phenomenon. Scholarly works document the rise and dissemination of populism (Aalberg et al. 2017; Albertazzi and McDonnell 2008b; Kriesi and Pappas 2015; Mudde 2004; Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser 2012). According to Wear (2008), populism is inherently empty and devoid of moral principles. Populism is not a new phenomenon, nor is it limited to the opposition or the ruling class or parties on the right or left. The numerous ways that populist occurrences affect political, social, and economic spheres are among the factors contributing to this issue's extraordinary attention (Cocco, 2022).

Media have been played two distinct roles in the global rise of populism. First, it is expected that populist actors and their ideologies would find a forum in the media (e.g. Vossen, 2012). It is thought that because of the way their ideals make sense to the media, populist actors get undue attention from the media. On its own, media content can be populist (Krämer, 2014; Mazzoleni, 2008).

### **1.1. The Global State of Populism**

The US saw the emergence of a third party in the late 19th century known as the People's Party (PP). It called itself a party of "populists." It originated from a radical agrarian development with a left slant. Of the two main parties in the nation, the Republican Party and the Equitable Party, the party was fundamental (Paracha, N. F., 2020). The party demanded workers' rights, a dynamic pay tax, nationalization of companies, and coordination of Senate decisions.

South Asian countries like Bangladesh, India, and Pakistan have different forms of populism from their European counterparts in part because migration isn't a big political headache there. In these countries, populism has focused on a wide range of topics, including resisting elites, minority concerns, poverty, and dehumanization (Kurlantzick 2018). The increasing middle classes and the upbeat young in cities are the main sources of support for populists in emerging countries. Populist leaders have used visions of an "illiberal religious resurgence" to excite social groups in Turkey, Poland, Russia, India, and Pakistan. On the other hand, populism centralizes political and governmental institutions in developed countries because it views them as elitist, isolated, and dangerous for neighbouring people (Bardhan, 2019).

#### **1.1.1. Populism in the Region of India and Pakistan**

Pakistan is undoubtedly not immune to the global trend towards populism, with ex-Prime Minister Imran Khan often considered a populist leader by many political analysts. Since assuming power, he has pursued divisive politics, sometimes silencing and other times disparaging protesters. Pakistan is indeed on a dangerous trajectory concerning the rise of populism in politics (Gillani, 2020). The adept manipulation of distinct forms to convey intimacy to his audiences and inspire them to identify with Imran Khan's vision for Pakistan is what defines his populist style. He uses unique forms to elicit thoughts about various topics, including religion, pluralism, patriotism, and debasement. His interpretation of Islam is edified; that is, he managed to use Medina to validate a plural society or Sharia to justify women's rights (Hassan, 2020).

While, in India, nationalism, caste, and dialect demands were the most often and centrally linked populist discourse, mobilization strategies, and tactics; fervent political beliefs were less

frequently and urgently linked. During the late colonial era, populist demands were widely transmitted by two types of political forces: multiethnic Indian patriotism and center and moocaste developments (Gudavarthy, 2020). The two parties that have ruled India since 1998, the Congress Party and the Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), were motivated by populism's demonstrated mobilizing victory to present contemporary anti-poverty measures after adopting a neo-liberal agenda in the 1990s (Subramanian, 2007). The following factors contributed to this victory, which made it noteworthy in the history of Indian household legislation: the charismatic Narendra Modi, who was able to successfully advocate for extraordinary development in Gujarat while serving as the state's chief minister; the BJP's ability to mobilize the most marginalized sections of society; the support of the RSS apparatus; and the party's platform, which garnered support from almost one-third of the country's population (Ammassari, 2018).

### **1.2. Statement of the problem**

Different methods have been taken to populist research; some studies view populism as a belief system or collection of ideas. Some popular definitions describe populism as a political movement or a style. However, the focus of this research is the surrounding practices of the media concerning populist pioneers. The purpose of this study is to examine and scrutinize the significant nature and tone of press framing for the coverage of populist leaders in both pre-election and post-election scenarios.

### **1.3. Objectives of the Research**

The study's aims are as follows:

- To what extent how the press give coverage to Populist leader of India and Pakistan.
- To comprehend how the media frames the populists in pre- and post-election contexts.
- To examines and distinguish the types of issues and types of frames used by the selected press during pre-election and post-election settings.

## **2. Literature Review**

A thin-centered ideology that deals with a "set of basic assumptions about the world" and more especially "the language that unwittingly expresses them" (Mudde, 2012). Populism was disputedly referred to as right-wing radicalism until the 20th century. But when other political figures from the established parties were referred to as "populists," the idea of populism changed (Gherghina & Soare, 2013). Researchers have examined a wide range of theoretical fields, methodologies, and techniques in an effort to know populism (Aalberg et al., 2017; Albertazzi & McDonnell, 2008; Gidron & Bonikowski, 2013; Kaltwasser et al., 2017; Laclau, 2005; Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2012). And describe populism as "a style of discourse, an ideology, and a method of political mobilization." According to Hovden (2019), the majority of the descriptions focused on the philosophy and style that highlighted the connection between the "people" and elites. However, the idea of populism faces specific ambiguity in current political occurrences, with the first approach using it as a tactic to consume a particular kind of political language for political mobilization. Other is a specific communication style that addresses personality politics (Abts & Rummens, 2007).

Populism is limited to a few fundamental ideas, such as "the people," "democracy," or "sovereignty" (Abts & Rummens, 2007). In the perspective of "thin-centered ideology," Freedon (1998) describes the ecology of populism and argues that it may coexist with other ideologies such as communism, ecologism, nationalism, or socialism. In a similar vein,

Waisbord (2018) dismissed populism as the product of "post-truth politics" and instead saw it as the result of certain political, economic, and sociocultural developments.

Essentially, populism described by Mudde (2004) as "a thin-centered philosophy that divided the society into two standardised and opposed groups, 'the pure people' versus 'the corrupt elite.'"

### **2.1. Media Strategies in Populism**

Media outlets frequently equated disruptive and inaccurate remarks made by populist leaders as newsworthy in order to garner public attention (Araújo et al., 2020).

A few large- and meso-level characteristics that might either strengthen or weaken the presence of populist elements in media scope were proposed by Maurer et al. (2019). Macro-level components, their analyses suggest significant relationships between the extent of populism in a country's daily newspapers and the role recognitions authors often have there. Populism seems to be less prevalent in countries where writers place a strong emphasis on education, suggesting that writers should take precautions to protect their audiences from populist messaging. The mainstream news scope integrates more populist themes, demonstrating a more notable degree of populism through the media, whereas authors consider themselves as facilitators of governments (stable portion). More (anti-elite) populism is seen in areas with a more negative journalistic culture, especially in newspapers and commentary. On the other hand, tabloid newspapers do not appear to be promoting more populist messages, according to meso-level organizational variables (Stanyer et al., 2019).

#### **2.1.1. Media Framing**

It is believed that populist messaging influence and mould people's opinions on laws and society (Hameleers et al., 2018). Furthermore, Mudde (2004) stated that the success of populist parties was somewhat influenced by media exposure. Because populist themes are so powerful, the media's contribution to populism's success can never be underestimated (Rooduijn 2014). According to (Stanyer et al., 2019), the media propagates a more socially conscious or religious definition of populism in a few countries. Furthermore, anti-elitism was the most often used indicator of populism in the media, with different countries having different elites (such as the national, supranational, or media elites) that were routinely condemned.

The success of populism in elections throughout the world and its exposure have been attributed in large part to the media, and social media in particular (Krämer, 2014). Voters have access to populist ideals through the media channels they choose or are exposed to, and populism becomes palpable through communication. Populist communication has become a significant area in this context (For example, Aalberg et al., 2017).

### **2.2. Theoretical Framework**

The method of combining news items conceptually and factually to communicate the main idea of the narrative is known as framing, and it serves as a major theoretical foundation for our study (Maslog et al., 2006). While D'Angelo (2002) claimed that different and competing theories should be developed to fully comprehend news framing, Entman (1993) highlighted that different strategies used in news framing should be brought under one umbrella. By pointing out that "the term framing has been used repeatedly to label similar but distinctly different approaches" (p. 103), Scheufele (1999) provided more support for Entman (1993).

According to the framing theory, the media presents a limited number of topics and arranges them in accordance with their significance (Ardèvol-Abreu, 2015). Framing gives

users a choice in how data are interpreted. The framing theory is regarded as the motive setting hypothesis at the current moment (what to think?). Furthermore, framing hypotheses bargains for ways to consider. Contextualizing this evidence in terms of populist framing led the scholar to examine the news framing of populist leaders in Indian and Pakistani press.

### 2.3. Research Questions and Hypotheses

RQ1: How do the framing strategies employed by the press for the populist leaders differ between pre-election and post-election periods?

RQ2: Which topics are mostly covered by the selected press for the framing of populist leaders within their respective country's press?

RQ3: How does the tone of the press coverage vary when reporting on populist leaders in Pre-election and post-election settings?

H1: The framing strategies of the press for the coverage of populist leaders will reflect variation between pre-election and post-election periods within their respective country's press.

H2: Press tend to adopt more critical tone when reporting on populist leaders in post-election period as compared to Pre-election period.

### 3. Methodology

This study conducted a systematic content analysis of one newspaper from Pakistan and one from India. This study will quantitatively examine the framing strategies of Indo-Pak populist leaders in the selected newspapers. The time periods of the study will be six months before and after elections. The data will obtain from the Lexis-Nexis as selected elite and popular press were archived on the database.

News stories of selected press e.g. *The Dawn* from Pakistan, *The Time of India* from India are considered the sample size for the study. The Dawn newspaper has relied on outside news sources, and it pays attention to the opinions of distant political frameworks that argue that the ordinary does not adequately elevate the event in a national context. Pakistani writers for the Dawn newspaper are required to nurture the event by bringing it back to Pakistan (Hussain, 2019). While, *The Times of India* speaks with the best journalists in India and has enough clout to influence government policies. and have a large readership and are India's multi-edition newspaper (Narayana & Kapur, 2011).

Pakistan held its 2018 general elections on Wednesday, July 25, 2018, to elect members of the National Assembly and four provincial assemblies. And Imran Khan takes over as Prime Minister on August 18, 2018. The 2019 Indian General Election was held in seven parts between April 11 and May 19, 2019. The ballots were tallied, and the results were announced on May 23. The study's time span will be around six months before and six months after the election of the selected country, for example, February 2018 to January 2019 in Pakistan's press. And from October 2018 to November 2019 in the Indian press.

#### 3.1. Conceptualization of scheme of Content

Variables	Categorization	Conceptualization
Topics: Framing Strategies of press for the coverage of Populist Leaders.	Corruption and Economy	Reports concerning dishonest or cynical acts, such as bribery, dark money, etc., Also information on employment, joblessness, wages,

		emergencies, fees, businesses, deals, and self-employment will be categorized as the news of Corruption and Economy.
	Elections	Election-related news and announcements, modifications to electoral laws and regulations, the end of establishment meddling, populist campaign tactics, etc., are all considered election-related News.
	Foreign Relations	News articles pertaining to international relations, agreements, and agreements will be classified under foreign policy.
	Government Execution	News stories of legislation that were designed to promote government execution include tasks including goal-setting, monitoring progress, and disclosing advancements. These actions are considered government execution.
	Justice and Others	News stories covering the changes to laws, penalties, retirement funds, healthcare, schooling, welfare states, social justice, technology, religion, climate change, ethics, and moral principles are included in the category of justice and other news.
<b>Tone</b>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Supportive</li> <li>2. Negative</li> <li>3. Neutral</li> </ol>	The tone of news articles referred to the viewpoints of the media or the kinds of emotions (Supportive, negative, or neutral) they expressed toward the political figures. whether the political leaders were discussed in a good, negative, or neutral manner.
<b>Time</b>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Pre-Election Period</li> <li>2. Post-Election Period</li> </ol>	In Pakistan, the pre-election period is anticipated to last from July 2017 to July 2018 and the post-election phase from August 2018 to August

		2019. In India, the pre-election period runs from April 2018 to April 2019 while the post-election phase is from May 2019 to May 2020.
<b>Frames</b>	1. Anti-Elite Frame	News stories in which elites are charged as being criminals, cunning, sluggish, ignorant, racist, extreme, undemocratic, and a host of other crimes. Elites are portrayed as a burden, as the cause of critical circumstances.
	2. People Centric Frame	News stories that describe the morality, charisma, credibility, intellect, competence, consistency, and other attributes are conferred upon the populace. The individuals are portrayed as not being a threat or burden, not being accountable for hostile circumstances.

Each story of the selected newspapers contain information about populist leaders of both countries would be consider as he unit of analysis for this research. The data is obtained from the Lexis-Nexis as selected press were archived on the database.

#### **4. Findings**

The sample of the study was 388 news stories. In which 197 (50.8%) being from *Dawn News* (Pak), and 191 (49.2%) from *The Times of India* (Ind). In the period of Pre-election Pakistan Total 111 (28.6%) news stories and in the phase of Post-Election Pakistan 106 (27.3%) news stories were published by the selected newspapers of both India and Pakistan. While, in the period of Pre-Election India 100 (25.8%) news stories and at the Post-Election India 71 (18.3%) news stories were published that gave coverage to populist leaders of India and Pakistan.

**RQ1: How do the framing strategies employed by the press for the populist leaders differ between pre-election and post-election periods?**

**Table- 4.1:** Cross-Tabulation of Newspapers, News Frames and Time period

Newspaper ID	Time Period	Frames		Total
		Anti Elite	People Centric	
Dawn	Pre-Election Pakistan	81 (41.1%)	14 (7.1%)	95 (48.2%)
	Post-Election Pakistan	63 (32.0%)	20 (10.2%)	83 (42.1%)
	Pre-Election India	4 (2.0%)	9 (4.6%)	13 (6.6%)
	Post-Election India	6 (3.0%)	0 (0.0%)	6 (3.0%)
	<b>Total</b>	<b>154 (78.2%)</b>	<b>43 (21.8%)</b>	<b>197 (100.0%)</b>
Times of India	Pre-Election Pakistan	10 (5.2%)	6 (3.1%)	16 (8.4%)
	Post-Election Pakistan	18 (9.4%)	5 (2.6%)	23 (12.0%)
	Pre-Election India	58 (30.4%)	29 (15.2%)	87 (45.5%)
	Post-Election India	51 (26.7%)	14 (7.3%)	65 (34.0%)
	<b>Total</b>	<b>137 (71.7%)</b>	<b>54 (28.3%)</b>	<b>191 (100.0%)</b>
Total	Pre-Election Pakistan	91 (23.5%)	20 (5.2%)	111 (28.6%)
	Post-Election Pakistan	81 (20.9%)	25 (6.4%)	106 (27.3%)
	Pre-Election India	62 (16.0%)	38 (9.8%)	100 (25.8%)
	Post-Election India	57 (14.7%)	14 (3.6%)	71 (18.3%)
	<b>Total</b>	<b>291 (75.0%)</b>	<b>97 (25.0%)</b>	<b>388 (100.0%)</b>
<b>Chi-Square: 21.845, df= 3, P= &lt;.001</b>				

Table-4.1 presents a crosstabulation of newspaper frames (anti-elite and people-centric) across different time periods (pre-election and post-election) for two newspapers, 'Dawn' and 'The Times of India'. In Pre-Election Pakistan, 'Dawn' newspaper published 95 news stories, of which 81 (48.2%) were framed as anti-elite and 14 (7.1%) as people-centric. In the post-election period Pakistan, 'Dawn' published 83 news stories, with 63 (42.1%) adopting an anti-elite frame and 20 (10.2%) portraying a people-centric perspective. While, in Pre-Election India, 'Dawn' published 13 news stories with 4 (6.6%) taking an anti-elite stance and 9 (4.6%) focusing on people-centric frame. Only 6 articles were published in post-election, with 6 (3.0%) adopting an anti-elite frame and none taking a people-centric frame.

On the other side, 'The Times of India' published 16 news stories in pre-election Pakistan, with 10 (8.4%) framed as anti-elite and 6 (3.1%) as people-centric. And in Post-Election Pakistan published 23 news with 18 (12.0%) adopting an anti-elite frame and 5 (2.6%) presenting a people-centric viewpoint. In Pre-Election India 'The Times of India' published 87

news with 58 (45.5%) adopting an anti-elite frame and 29 (15.2%) portraying people-centric Frame. And in Post-Election India 65 news with 51 (34.0%) framed as anti-elite and 14 (7.3%) as people-centric.

**H1: The framing strategies of the press for the coverage of populist leaders will reflect variation between pre-election and post-election periods within their respective country's press.**

There were 111 news stories published in pre-election Pakistan, with 91 (28.6%) adopting an anti-elite frame and 20 (5.2%) focusing on people-centric Frame. And 106 news stories in post-election Pakistan, with 81 (27.3%) adopting an anti-elite frame and 25 (6.4%) presenting a people-centric frame. At the time of Pre-Election India total of 100 news stories were published 62 (25.8%) adopting an anti-elite frame and 38 (9.8%) focusing on people-centric frame. 71 news articles published, with 57 (18.3%) adopting an anti-elite frame and 14 (3.6%) presenting a people-centric frame (Table-4.1).

Considering the aggregate data from both newspapers, there is a significant relationship between time periods and frames, signifying that the framing of articles collectively varies across pre-election and post-election periods. So, the framing strategies of the press for the coverage of populist leaders will reflect variation between pre-election and post-election periods within their respective country's press there was a significant relationship between time period and frames (anti-elite, people-centric) with all tests showing p-values below 0.05.

**RQ2: Which topics are mostly covered by the selected press for the framing of populist leaders within their respective country's press?**

The highest number of news stories (86, 22.2% of total) were focused on Corruption & Economy. Among these, 44 news stories (39.6%) were published during the pre-election period in Pakistan, while 19 news stories (17.9%) were published post-election in Pakistan. In the context of India, 16 news stories (16.0%) were pre-election, and 7 stories (9.9%) were post-election. The Election topic had a total of 118 news stories (30.4% of total). The majority of these articles were related to India, with 47 (47.0%) published pre-election and 20 (28.2%) post-election. In Pakistan, 36 articles (32.4%) were pre-election, and 15 news stories (14.2%) were post-election.

(Table-4.2).

Topics	Time Period				Total
	Pre-Election Pakistan	Post-Election Pakistan	Pre-Election India	Post-Election India	
Corruption & Economy	44 (39.6%)	19 (17.9%)	16 (16.0%)	7 (9.9%)	86 (22.2%)
Election	36 (32.4%)	15 (14.2%)	47 (47.0%)	20 (28.2%)	118 (30.4%)
Foreign Relations	11 (9.9%)	21 (19.8%)	14 (14.0%)	11 (15.5%)	57 (14.7%)
Government Execution	9 (8.1%)	41 (38.7%)	6 (6.0%)	24 (33.8%)	80 (20.6%)

Justice & Others	11 (9.9%)	10 (9.4%)	17 (17.0%)	9 (12.7%)	47 (12.1%)
<b>Total</b>	<b>111</b> <b>(100.0%)</b>	<b>106</b> <b>(100.0%)</b>	<b>100</b> <b>(100.0%)</b>	<b>71</b> <b>(100.0%)</b>	<b>388</b> <b>(100.0%)</b>

Total 57 news stories (14.7% of total) were focused on Foreign Relations. Post-election Pakistan had the highest count with 21 news (19.8%), followed by pre-election India with 14 news stories (14.0%). Pre-election Pakistan and post-election India had 11 news each (9.9% and 15.5%, respectively). While, news stories concerning Government Execution amounted to 80 (20.6% of total). The majority of these news were post-election in Pakistan, with 41 (38.7%). Pre-election Pakistan had 9 news stories (8.1%), pre-election India had 6 news (6.0%), and post-election India had 24 news (33.8%). 47 news stories (12.1% of total) were covered other topics. The distribution across time periods and countries was relatively even (See Table-4.2), with pre-election Pakistan having 11 news stories (9.9%), post-election Pakistan with 10 news (9.4%), pre-election India with 17 news (17.0%), and post-election India with 9 news stories (12.7%).

#### **RQ4: How does the tone of the press coverage vary when reporting on populist leaders in Pre-election and post-election settings?**

The table-4.4 describe a cross-tabulation of tone and time periods in press coverage, focusing on pre-election and post-election periods in Pakistan and India. The tone is categorized into positive, negative, and neutral, providing insights into the overall sentiment portrayed in the coverage:

Time Period	Tone			Total
	Positive	Negative	Neutral	
Pre-Election Pakistan	90 (23.2%)	12 (3.1%)	9 (2.3%)	111 (28.6%)
Post-Election Pakistan	34 (8.8%)	43 (11.1%)	29 (7.5%)	106 (27.3%)
Pre-Election India	52 (13.4%)	30 (7.7%)	18 (4.6%)	100 (25.8%)
Post-Election India	28 (7.2%)	32 (8.2%)	11 (2.8%)	71 (18.3%)
<b>Total</b>	<b>204</b> <b>(52.6%)</b>	<b>117</b> <b>(30.2%)</b>	<b>67</b> <b>(17.3%)</b>	<b>388</b> <b>(100.0%)</b>
<b>Chi-Square: 62.592, df= 6, P= &lt;.001</b>				

In the pre-election period, the majority of coverage exhibits a positive tone, with 90 news stories (23.2%) in Pakistan and 52 (13.4%) in India. However, the occurrence of positive tone decreases significantly in the post-election period, with only 34 news stories (8.8%) in Pakistan and 28 news (7.2%) in India. Equally, the frequency of negative tone increases in the post-election period compared to the pre-election period. In Pakistan, negative tone rises from 12 news stories (3.1%) pre-election to 43 news stories (11.1%) post-election, while in India, it increases from 30 news stories (7.7%) to 32 news stories (8.2%). See Table-4.4.

**H2: Press tends to adopt more critical tone when reporting on populist leaders in post-election period as compared to Pre-election period.**

Neutral tone remains relatively consistent across time periods and countries, with a slight decrease observed in the post-election period. This suggests that while the overall sentiment shifts between positive and negative, the proportion of coverage maintaining a neutral stance remains relatively stable (Table-4.4). The Chi-Square value of 62.592 with 6 degrees of freedom and a p-value of  $<.001$  indicates a statistically significant association between tone and time period. This suggests that the observed differences in tone distribution across time periods are reflect systematic patterns in press coverage. Press tends to adopt more critical tone when reporting on populist leaders in post-election period as compared to Pre-election period. Hence, H2 is supportive.

### **5. Discussion/Conclusion**

The data from Dawn newspaper illustrates significant variability in framing across time periods, particularly in Pakistan. Dawn appears to emphasize anti-elite frames, with a substantial portion of news stories adopting this perspective, especially during both pre-election and post-election phases in Pakistan. Conversely, Dawn seems to allocate fewer news stories to people-centric framing, indicating a potential imbalance in the representation of diverse perspectives within its coverage. In contrast, The Hindu demonstrates relatively consistent framing across time periods, suggesting a more stable reporting approach. The Hindu appears to maintain a balance between anti-elite and people-centric frames, with both perspectives receiving relatively equal attention across different phases of the electoral cycle.

Both countries exhibit significant coverage of Corruption & Economy, indicating the salience of these issues in the political discourse leading up to and following elections. Corruption remains a prominent theme in both countries, the distribution of news differs, with Pakistan showing a higher concentration of coverage during pre-election periods, possibly indicating heightened scrutiny of political conduct prior to elections. Post-election periods witness increased coverage of Government Execution, particularly in Pakistan. This may indicate heightened scrutiny of government performance and policy implementation following elections, reflecting public expectations for accountability and governance effectiveness. There is a noticeable decrease in positive tone and an increase in negative tone post-election. These variations may reflect differences in socio-political contexts, media landscapes, and audience preferences between the two countries. Topics coverage reflects the evolving priorities and concerns of both countries' media landscapes, highlighting the intersection of politics, governance, and public discourse.

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