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<b>Article:</b>	<b>A Payoff of Cooperation and Non-cooperation: An Analysis of Pak-Afghan Relations during Cold War</b>
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### **Abstract**

Pak-Afghan relations are consisting of non-cooperation and mistrust, which are narrating the Game Theory. Just after the inception of Pakistan, it was the instinct desire to have cordial relations with Afghanistan. Unfortunately, the misapprehension of Afghanistan created the vacuum of non-cooperation between the two neighboring countries. Afghanistan policy of defection over Durand Line, Pakhtunistan and support for the militants in FATA and Baluchistan and resultantly Pakistan's support for Mujahedeen and Taliban, further aggravated the situation. Though limited cooperation was seen during Daud era, Taliban regime and in the War against Terrorism but it could not let cooperation to get roots. This paper employs the approach of Game Theory to analyses the payoff of cooperation and non-cooperation in the light of Pak-Afghan relations during Cold War. Furthermore, it investigates that how much the policy of cooperation and give-and-take will bring payoff for both of the two.

**Key Words:** Payoff, Zero-sum game, Non zero-sum game, Nash equilibrium, Pak-Afghan Relations, Durand Line, Pakhtunistan

### **Introduction:**

Afghanistan is Pakistan's Western neighbor and a Muslim majority country. Major chunk of its population is composed of Pashtun. Pakistan also has Khyber Pakhtunkhwa a Pashtun majority province in the North West. Despite these many similarities the relations of both remained hostile and unfriendly throughout the ages. Pakistan hosted millions of refugees from Afghanistan in eve of the Soviet invasion. Pakistan faced many challenges as these refugees remained great burden on the vulnerable economy of Pakistan for more than five decades. Apart from this these refugees created law and order situation for the host country as well. Despite all these Afghanistan never ever whole heartedly accepted Pakistan as its neighbor and brotherly Muslim country.

The Pak-Afghan relations are the outcome of actions and reactions, mistrust, non-cooperation and defection. Individual decisions were the dominant factor, and zero sum game was followed during the Cold War. Resultantly, there was an environment of mistrust and disharmony.

From its very inception in 1947, Pakistan had faced the security issue from India. From western side Afghanistan's antagonistic nature increased security issue. Pakistan tried to have close and friendly relations with Afghanistan but unfortunately Afghanistan claim over Durand Line and Pakhtunistan became the source of defections. Afghanistan raised this issue till Soviet invasion and after that in different periods of King Zahir Shaha, Sardar Daud and Babrak Kermal. However, during regime of Sardar Daud Durand Line was accepted and considered as an official border between Pakistan and Afghanistan.

Relations between the two neighbors are still characterized on mistrust and non-cooperation. These unfriendly relations never ever benefited one or the other neighbor. The tense relations between the two benefited India more than these two. The paper focuses on how these tense relations played a disadvantageous role for both Pakistan and Afghanistan. It also sees that what are the main reasons which created an environment of mistrust and what benefits or advantages India is getting from these unsettled relations. These and many other alarming questions need scholarly attentions to highlight these issues between the two countries. As this state of mistrust and ambiguity benefited no one in the past and someone else benefited on the other hand.

### **Issues between Pakistan and Afghanistan:**

#### **Durand Line Issue**

After the inception of Pakistan, Afghanistan was the only country in the world who opposed Pakistan in the United Nations (UN) because of Durand Line and Pakhtunistan. Afghanistan turned null and void the agreement of Durand Line and claimed that this agreement was under compulsion and duress, so it is not acceptable to Afghanistan. Although, due to internal and external problems, the then Amir of Afghanistan, Abdul Rehman requested to the British Viceroy, Sir Mortimer Durand to draw a line between Afghanistan and British India. So, agreement had been done between Amir Abdul Rehman and Sir Mortimer Durand November 12, 1893 (Mazharet, 2009: 205). Later on, this agreement was regurgitated three times by the Afghan's rulers, Habibullah the son of the former and Amanullah, the son of Habibullah obeyed to agreement (Burke, 1973: 81). Furthermore, Nadir Shah, the Amir of Afghanistan also showed the reaffirmation of treaty through exchange of letter with British government (Careo, 1965: 465). But in the modern history of Afghanistan, this chain of affirmation was not maintained by the King Zahir Shah, after the inception of Pakistan. The leaders of Afghanistan turned out openly with arguments for the invalidity of the Durand Line.

The Afghan government clarified their point of view that an Agreement of Durand Line was establish under pressure. They also claimed that agreement was concluded with British government, now they ceased the power, this agreement has no validity to maintain

further. They also presented the evidence that the Anglo Afghan Treaty of 1921 is null and void. Thus Afghanistan has legal sovereignty over the territory of Durand Line and the River Indus (Hussain, 2005: 16).

While in response, Pakistan clarified that the agreement was not under compulsion, it was the sole desire of the Amir Abdul Rehman, who requested to the Viceroy of British India for the demarcation and publically accepted it (Careo, 1965: 381). It was also added that this treaty was reaffirmed three times by the successor of Amir Abdul Rehman and they were agreed on the agreement of Durand Line. Furthermore it was cleared from the International Law that colonial state has the validity over the agreement and territory what had done with the dominated state (Jennings, 2008). As this agreement had been affirmed with British and now it is the legacy of Pakistan. The United Kingdom also decided this issue in favour of Pakistan.

### **The Pakhtunistan Issue:**

Afghanistan claimed over the territory of Pakhtun, as early mentioned that Afghanistan considered that Durand Line agreement was accepted because of the British pressure, this demarcation divided the Pakhtuns thought they are one nation, having same language, same religion, same culture and same tradition. Pakhtuns were living together from centuries, the demarcation divided them into parts and so being one nation they have the right of self-determination (Hussain, 2005: 17). Ethnological was the main objective for the creation of Pakhtunistan. Afghanistan's government argued that Pakhtuns are different from the rest of the people of Pakistan on the basis of each aspect of life, so, a separate state should be given to them.

In the referendum of 1947 in Peshawar, Pakhtun casted votes in favor of Pakistan, therefore, Afghanistan have no right to claim over the Pakhtun's territory. Afghanistan concern for the unity and independent state of Pakhtun was not right, because Afghanistan did not include the Pakhtuns whose were living inside Afghanistan. Rather, the idea of the Greater Pakhtunistan by the Afghanistan government was only for the annexation of territories which are now under the control of Pakistan. The Pakhtun would, therefore, continue to be split between two sovereign states. This raises the idea of vagueness, in this manner deteriorating the case for an autonomous Pakhtunistan (Burke, 1973: 88). The idea that the Durand Line between Pakistan and Afghanistan is random line is a false impression. Both the issues i.e. Durand Line and Pakhtunistan were the main issues between Pakistan and Afghanistan, which rose in different periods in the history of both the states. Consequently, both paid huge lose because of mistrust and non-cooperation. In addition, these issues invited foreign states to interfere in their affaires for their own interest.

### **Theoretical Frame Work:**

This section of the paper focusing on the Game Theory, where the principle of Prisoner Dilemma, Zero sum game, Non-zero sum game and Nash Equilibrium are applied to Pak-Afghan relations. The assemble data are analyzed and judged in the light of Game Theory, and hypothesized that where is cooperation, noncooperation, mistrust and defection in the relations of Islamabad and Kabul. Additionally, focusing on the payoff that what is the payoff of mutual cooperation and reciprocal policies and what the payoff of non-cooperation, mistrust and hegemonic policies are?

Game Theory is basically a game in the international relations, where the states are players or agents, who act rationally regarding the situation and struggle for achieving the best payoff. Observing the situation, the agents show cooperation, non-cooperation, dominant and dominated behavior. In the Game Theory, where the agents or player turn to mutual cooperation means stitch to Nash Equilibrium, both get payoff. If one cooperates and the other not means there is a Zero Sum Game is followed, so the cooperated receive less while the defector receive a huge amount of payoff. There is also a Non-zero Sum Game, means

both the agents are not cooperated, so, both of them get the payoff but it is less than mutual cooperation (Theodore, 2001: 4-38). Although, there is no applying of mathematical model but an effort has been done to compile the events in relations between Pakistan and Afghanistan and evaluate the effects of cooperation and non-cooperation.

### **Payoff for Non-cooperation:**

Non-cooperation in an international relation brings mistrust and defection, where the gaining of one is loss for the other, as follow in the zero sum game. According to the realist school of thought that there is anarchy in the international community, each one state is responsible for self-security, because the weaker is strong enough to kill the strongest either by secret mechanism or with the help of other (Burchill, 2005: 32). No one loss the opportunity to defame their national interest, no one is permanent friend or foe, only the national interest is permanent. Every one observes the situation, and prepares the rational decision to take an action for achieving their goals. So, anarchy in the international community and the fear of self-security created the mistrust and non-cooperation among states.

The issues of Durand Line and Pakhtunistan were the main sources of tension and mistrust between Islamabad and Kabul. Kabul claimed over the territory of Pakistan, but in response Pakistan strategy has aspired to brother relations with Afghanistan, because the security threats from India brought Pakistan to mutual cooperation to avoid any disorder with Afghanistan (Razvi, 1971: 156). But Afghanistan did not change her hostile nature, because of the misconception i.e. India propagated that Pakistan will never survive for a long time, so this was the driving force behind the Afghan's claim over Duran Line and Pakhtunistan.

President Mohammed Ayub Khan describes Afghanistan's reservations in the following words,

“When Pakistan came into existence, there were two misconceptions in the minds of Afghan leaders. First misconception was the result of Indian constant propaganda that Pakistan would not be able to survive as a separate state. Afghan leaders believed this to be true and decided to stake claims on to Pakistan territory before it was disintegrated. Consequently, they laid claim on Pakhtunistan....The second misconception lay in the attitude of the Afghan rulers themselves. If their assumption proved wrong and Pakistan did survive, they realized that Pakistan would be a democratic country. This would naturally undermine the position of the rulers in Afghanistan. So they made these claims to our lands (Hussain, 2005: 12).”

King Zahir Shah gave anti-speech of Pakistan and the humiliation of the Pakistani flag by the Afghan Air Forces, further worsen the Pak-Afghan relation (Matinuddin, 1999: 3). Sardar Daud who was the main exponent of Pakhtunistan called for protest against Pakistan's decision of the merger of the Western Province into “One Unit”, this protests turned into the incident, the protester attacked over the Pakistan's Embassy in Kabul on March 30, 1955 (Hussain, 2005: 21). There was the domination of individual rationality with no cooperation, and followed the philosophy of zero sum game. Under such situation, Pakistan has only one option to secure her Eastern and Western border by any means. For the elimination of the security constraints, Pakistan joined SEATO and CENTO, enter into the alliance of the US. Pakistan alliance with US was unacceptable to Afghanistan, and with support of India started a propaganda that it will create an unbalancing in the region. Later on Kabul request for arm support from the US, but it was rejected in 1954 (Kux, 2001: 60), consequently, Afghanistan pushed to Soviet Union and India. Due to the absence of collective rational decision, the relations turns to worse, when Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev visited to Delhi and Kabul in 1955. Moscow offered military and economic assistance to Kabul and assured \$100 million aid, not only these Moscow endorsed India claimed over Kashmir and Kabul over

Pakhtunistan (Kux, 2001: 78). Tension between the states so increased that Afghan's tribesmen raided over Pakistan border, which led to the close off relations, consulates and trade.

Deadlocks over many issues, limited cooperation and the absence of mutual rational decision means Nash Equilibrium decision, not only invited the foreigners to interfere in the internal affairs of both the states but also they faced the severe payoff of closing border, trade and consulates on both sides. As result, Afghanistan a land lock country faced economic issues because Kabul depends upon Pakistan for their import and export. Additionally, both states became the zone of war, and still cutting the crops of war.

Sardar Daud who was the champion of the Pukhtunistan issue, once again became a president after deposing King Zahir in 1973 (Calvocoressi, 2001: 570-71). At this time, he had the supported of PDPA, who were pro Soviet policies. Ultimately, it is alarming for Pakistan, because Pakistan was pro US elements, and once again both the states fall into defection. Daud supported insurgents in Baluchistan and in FATA (now merged into KPK), while in response Pakistan strategy was reciprocal, to destabilize Daud's government, Islamabad supported anti-Daud and Soviet forces in Afghanistan. In 1974-75, relations were so hard that both the states deployed their forces on the border. However, when Daud realized that anti-Pakistan policies are not in favour of Afghanistan, he called for cooperation and harmony with Pakistan. There was a reciprocal visited between ZA Bhutto and King President Daud in 1976. In a little period of mutual cooperation brought huge payoff for both, Pakistan agreed to release the ANP leaders, while President Daud recognized the Durand Line as a frontier line (Shah, 2000). Unfortunately, the process of rapprochement finished before starting, Daud was dethroned and Noor Mohammad Traki became as a President while Hafiz Ullah Amin Prime Minister of Afghanistan. A coup of General Zia took over and imprisoned ZA Bhutto, and the end of mutual relations buried up.

Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan on December 27, 1979 and had chosen Babrak Karmal as the president of Afghanistan. Babrak Karmal was a pro-Soviet, and proved to be frightening for Pakistan, as brought the Soviet Union to the border of Pakistan closed to the Khyber Pass, a habitual way for the foreign invaders of Sub-continent. The USSR invasion seen more harm for Pakistan because of Soviet support to Afghanistan in Baloch insurgency and continued uncertainty in Pakistan (Durani, 2016: 39). They were near to Arabian Sea, Baluchistan and five hundred miles away from the Persian Gulf. Many thinkers believed that the final stop of the Soviet Union troops would be Pakistan.

The then President Zia Ul Haq, saw the Soviet invasion as threat to the sovereignty of Pakistan, it was decided "to fight the battle for Pakistan" in Afghanistan. For the accomplishment of Soviet threats, Pakistan called for the Jihad in Afghanistan on the request of the US. ISI with the support of CIA trained the Mujahideen in Peshawar and sent them to Afghanistan. US have full supported with Pakistan in this war economical as well as military. US provided arms to Mujahideen on behalf of ISI. However, Soviet Union backed in 1988, after concluded Geneva Accord. US and Soviet Union left Afghanistan in destruction without any political, social and economic support and aid.

This war created severe challenges not only for Afghanistan but also a huge loss for Pakistan in the political, social and economic sphere. According to AZ Hilali, More than three million people fled from Afghanistan to Pakistan, which culminated the threat of external and internal security. Furthermore, Pakistan's society suffered from drug and narcotics trafficking, diffusion of the Kalashnikov Culture and lawlessness and anarchy in society, the spread of terrorism, sectarianism, extremism and insurgency in Baluchistan and Karachi is the chain of Afghan war. Kalashnikov culture started during the Soviet

invasion of Afghanistan and reached to the peak when US openly provided arm channel to Mujahideen of Afghanistan through Pakistan. There were also the spread of drugs and narcotize after Soviet invasion, before the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the cultivation of poppy was unknown in Pakistan, but after 1982, the numbers of drug addict were increased from 124,000 to 450,000 with the addition of 5000 heroines addict. According to the current estimated, there are more than 3.5 million drug addicts in Pakistan (Hilali, 2002: 13). Other implications were related to Kashmir issue, the policy of Pakistan to deal the Afghan situation was criticized by the world and the policy of Kashmir has been weakened to a great extent due to the presence of international terrorists in the region. The Indians took a very big advantage of Pakistan's policies in Afghanistan, and defended their own illegal activities in Kashmir. The Indians had compared the activities of insurgents in Afghanistan with the activities of freedom fighters in Kashmir. Pakistan did not take the situation seriously and concentrated on the position of Afghanistan and lost some support about Kashmir dispute (Durani, et. al., 2016: 26). To destabilize the society of Pakistan morally, Soviet Union with the support of Afghanistan established psychological warfare against Pakistan. For this purpose, the intelligence agencies of Soviet Union, KGB and Afghanistan's KHAD prepared thousands of beautiful and young girls belongs to Afghanistan, Russia and Central Asia send to Pakistan mostly NWFP. These prostitute girls mostly targeted political leaders, military officers and other government officers. They worked under the supervision of KHAD and KGB (Hilali, 2002: 13). According to the report of BBC Urdu program "sarbeen" that more than 8,000 prostitute girls were pushed to Pakistan (Hassan, 2009: 38).

#### **Payoff for Cooperation:**

The historic mirror of the Pak-Afghan relations are full of distrust and non-cooperation, as result there were constant clashes on border, support of border militancy, banned on trade, foreign interference and so on. In Game Theory, individual decision is adopted to get high payoff, but actually, individual decision created mistrust between the agents and led to defection and war. Furthermore, taking action in zero sum way is enable the player to get short term goal, but as a result the other player knows the skill and reciprocally never miss any chance to take revenge. As in the relations of Pakistan and Afghanistan, both sides turned limited to cooperation. Both are always focusing on zero sum game. As result there were severe payoffs for non-cooperation.

The payoff of mutual cooperation is higher than non-cooperation, it reduce the tension between the players and limited the race of arms. It produces the principles of reciprocal that works with mutual concern and general agreements on trade, and limited tax and tariff on import export. As the policy of harmony was followed between ZA Bhutto and Sardar Daud, as result the former released the ANP leaders, while the later recognized the Durand Line as a boundary line between Pakistan and Afghanistan (Shah, 2000). Although, Durand Line was the root cause of tension between Islamabad and Kabul, and Daud was the main exponent of this issue.

The principle of Nash Equilibrium in the Prisoner Dilemma, are necessary for both the state. Nash Equilibrium focus on win-win situation, where is high payoff for the agents of the game, in this principle agents are focusing on situation and emerge a rational decision which provide an equal payoff for both, no one turns to low payoff but remain in balance. If Pakistan persuaded Afghanistan and provided routes for trade and bring them to harmony, it would produce high payoff, rather to alliance with US and Afghanistan with USSR. There was already tension between the East and West and the Cold War was there, so both of them were in struggle to have influence over many states as possible, and this chance was provided by Kabul and Islamabad their self. Consequently, both were and still destabilize because of the foreign interference. If by mutual cooperation, both the states solve their issue it would be

better than non-cooperation. There was the policy of tit for tat, no one provided the chances of communication. Afghanistan always made a policy on the gesture of India and Soviet Union while in response Pakistan remained under the shadow of the US.

Another reason of the non-cooperation between Pak-Afghan was, both were in struggle to fulfil their interest and got benefits from each other (Usman, et. al. (n.d). Afghanistan always supported insurgents groups in FATA and Baluchistan because to annexation of Pakhtunistan and Baluchistan with Afghanistan for the purposes to reach water and got routs for the international trade. Afghanistan is a landlocked country and depends upon their neighbors for the external trade. While, Pakistan has a political and geographic strategic interest, the later wanted to have influence over Afghanistan and reduce the Indian influence in Afghanistan and in the region as well. So both the states reciprocated each other through zero sum game. If the government of Pakistan focus on enhancement policy or give and take policy rather than hand on or hand off policy, and provided aid to Afghanistan as India done and doing during US war against terrorism in Afghanistan, its result would be different as yet going.

In international relations conflicts are inevitable, conflict prevention, management and resolution need serious deliberation. Irregular demands, claims and individual decision are always unacceptable to another player. Violent actions are expensive and destructive for both or multi agents, it take human lives, material destruction. So, paying attention on non-cooperation or dominant decision and action are very costive in nature as compare to peace talk, negotiation and commitment (Jeong, 2017: 116). Peaceful negotiation is a better way to solve problems. In Pak-Afghan relations, Afghanistan claimed and Pakistan reaches to conflicts. It is necessary to adopt the way of negotiation, good offices, inquiry, arbitration, judicial settlement, conciliation, mediation and problem solving workshop, second track diplomacy and reconciliation. These are much better way to solve the issues.

### **Conclusion:**

The payoff in Game Theory depends upon decision of the player, if both players mutually interconnect and cooperate, both will get high payoff, if both do not cooperate, as result they will get payoff but it would be less as in cooperation. Pak-Afghan relations always followed on the parameter of Zero Sum Game, where the loss of one is the gaining of other. Both did not cooperate with each other. Afghanistan adopted non-cooperative attitude only for gaining Durand Line and annexation of Pakthun's territory while Pakistan policy maintained to encounter it.

The external players had a greater role in the destabilization of Pak-Afghan relations during Cold War. Afghanistan was supported by the Soviet Union and India. India had a strategic interest in Afghanistan. In fact, India wanted to have influence over Afghanistan only to destabilize Pakistan because of Kashmir issue. Soviet Union always supported Afghanistan on the issue of Durand Line and Pakhtunistan against Pakistan because Pakistan was an ally of the US during Cold War. Thus, both the states should cooperate with each other on any issue and never allow any external actor to interfere in their domestic affairs.

The government of Pakistan should cooperate with Afghanistan in political, social and economic sphere. Pakistan should provide military and economic aid to Afghanistan so that it does not depend on India as it might create security issue for Pakistan. More than that, Pakistan should focus on peace and stability inside Afghanistan because stability or instability in Afghanistan directly affected Pakistan.

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