

## Journal of Peace, Development and Communication



Volume 06, Issue 02, June 2022  
 pISSN: 2663-7898, eISSN: 2663-7901  
 Article DOI: <https://doi.org/10.36968/JPDC-V06-I02-16>  
 Homepage: <https://pdfpk.net/pdf/>  
 Email: [se.jpdc@pdfpk.net](mailto:se.jpdc@pdfpk.net)

<b>Article:</b>	<b>Populist Policymaking: Analyzing Pakistani Perspective</b>
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<b>Published:</b>	13 <sup>th</sup> June 2022
<b>Publisher Information:</b>	Journal of Peace, Development and Communication (JPDC)
<b>To Cite this Article:</b>	Abbas, Qamar., Khan, Rooh-ul-Amin. & Haq, Amrat. (2022). "Populist Policymaking: Analyzing Pakistani Perspective" <i>Journal of Peace, Development and Communication</i> , vol. 06, no. 02, 2022, pp. 218–237, <a href="https://doi.org/10.36968/JPDC-V06-I02-16">https://doi.org/10.36968/JPDC-V06-I02-16</a>
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## ABSTRACT

The rise of populist governments around the world provides a unique chance to analyze how populist leaders and parties govern. The substantive and discursive elements of populist policies and decision-making processes are conceptually addressed. This study explains an ideal type of populist policymaking mechanism along with the scope of content, methods, and discourses. In order to analyze the conformity of an actual policymaking mechanism of populist government, we use a qualitative congruence study. The paper claims that an overwhelming response to majoritarian attitudes is distinctive aspect of populist policies. Whereas, populists tend to devalue the role of legal policy institutions or technocratic competence, marginalize veto players and adopt volatile policy changes. Populist leaders frequently employ crisis frames in policymaking and reinforcing polarization in policy stances. Finally, the article concludes that between 2018 and 2022, Pakistan's policymaking tendencies were mainly consistent with ideal type of populist policymaking.

**Keywords:** Pakistan, policymaking, political parties, social policy, populism, congruence, elite, people.

## INTRODUCTION

In populist research, the policy components of populism and their relationship to divisive policy approaches have been largely ignored. According to Mudde's key paper published in (2004), populism studies have put their focus on political leaders and discourses, with special attention paid to the problematic link between liberal democracy and populism (Canovan, 1999; Walgrave & Jagers, 2007; Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2012). The scarcity of attention, in the populism literature, to the real-world effects of populist government is all the more startling given that populist political parties have taken power in a number of European nations and the America in the last decade (Hawkins & Littvay, 2019). Policy improvements implemented by populist administrations may have had a positive impact. As a result, the fact that populist political parties and individuals are in power, provide a unique chance to analyze their governance and policymaking practices. In this regard, the case of South Asia is general and Pakistan in particular a pertinent one to study the policy processes under the leading of populist governments, which in their opposition times remained under severe criticism. No doubt the case of Central and Eastern Europe are equally important to understand as providing the mother factors for populist policy studies, as "populism in Europe is, if anything, even more widespread" (Hanspeter, 2014) in these nations than in rest of the world. The policy process, according to the populist leader Imran Khan, remained throughout the history of Pakistan in the hands of status quo.

As a result, the goal of this research study is to characterize populist policymaking. We conceptually address three essential parts of policy formation in order to achieve this goal: the substantive (content), procedural, and rhetorical characteristics of populist policies. We don't perform a thorough, step-by-step investigative study in a specific policy field here; instead, we leverage empirical findings from previous research studies to demonstrate how to employ ideal type in empirical research. We analyzed the effects of populist policy on societal polarization and the future of liberal democracies especially in Pakistan.

### **1. Methodology and Analytical Framework**

We utilize the Weberian ideal type framework because our goal is to theorize and conceptualize the pertinent elements of populism in policymaking. Recent methodological and theoretical debates (Rosenberg, 2016) have sparked fresh ideas of using framework of an ideal type in empirical policy research (Peters & Pierre, 2016). We attempted to create social ideal types based on this aim. In our situation, this indicates that the discursive and substantive components of both constitutive features of an ideal type of the policymaking, while the procedural components reflect the context of social connections.

We analyze the practicality and consistency of our ideal type of populist policymaking using the congruence analysis method (Blatter & Haverland, 2012). As a result, we evaluate the consistency of an assumed typical instance, Pakistan Tehreek e Insaf's policies from 2018 to 2022, with theoretical assumptions derived from deemed ideal type. Pakistan's post-2018 government is a perfect and true case of populist exercising power and social policymaking is an especially good area to analyze populist policymaking since populist political leaders seek to reframe social policy parameters to strengthen their power regime (Nordensvard & Ketola, 2018). Welfare policy decisions immediately touch to majority of the people, and hence play a critical role in increasing electorate support for majoritarian candidates.

Government ideals on national solidarity and processes of inclusion and exclusion are reflected in welfare measures such as pensions, taxation, unemployment, and family policy. We used policy and legislative documents (Prime Minister's assertions, laws and bills) available on websites and database of the Pakistani Comparative Agendas Projects in addition to previous research on Pakistani welfare state reforms after 2018. We systematically examine the primary substantive, procedural, and rhetorical features of social policy making in Pakistan after identifying substantial welfare state developments between 2018 and 2022. In this way, we combine a post-positivist discursive approach with a positivist institutional analysis viewpoint on policy decisions.

## **2. Policymaking under Liberal Democracies**

Governance and policymaking differ from country to country and across time: Different governance models are defined by the different individuals and institutions that participate in the execution of governance functions (Pierre & Peters, 2016). However, we argue that in liberal democracies, the ideal style of policymaking is implicitly adopted, regardless of the governance types (Baumgartner & Berry, 2009). One implicit assumption of liberal democratic policymaking models is that policy stances are shaped by a somewhat cohesive system of ideas: Ideas are important in policy development because they "may explain critical aspects of policy development" (Béland, 2009). While, at the same time, majoritarian preferences play an important role, they are restrained by minority rights protection. (Weible, 2008) Institutionalism is a key procedural aspect of policymaking in liberal democracies: Political leaders have less discretion since the policy process is constrained and channeled by official and informal institutions (Béland, 2009; Morgan, 2013).

Pluralism's constitutional embedding constrains majoritarian logic (Przeworski, Stokes, Stokes, & Manin, 1999) as pluralism recognizes the participation of various socio-political actors all the way through policy cycle (Baumgartner F. R., Berry, Hojnacki, Leech, & Kimball, 2009). This means that public debates enlighten voters about suggested policy choices. Opponent policies in its policymaking paradigm are perceived by several stakeholders through conflicting discourses and policy frames (Béland & Cox, 2013). However, discursive governance has a limited role: Despite the prevalence of strategic metaphors in government discourses, public policy issues are frequently conceived using specialized policy language terminology (Korkut, Mahendran, Cox, & Bucken-Knapp, 2015).

As an anchor, we employ the ideal type of policymaking in the liberal democracies (i.e. see Table 1), which may be the polar opposite of the populist policymaking ideal type. Populist policymaking, on the other hand, is not always a wholly divergent, alternative type of governing that leans toward illiberal governance (Pappas T. S., 2014). Indeed, populist policymaking could emerge within the liberal democracies, comparable to the 'state control' governance paradigm (Peters & Pierre, 2016).

### **3. Populist Policy making style**

In modern political science, populism is a particularly shaky conceptual structure (Aslanidis, 2016), as it incorporates three conflicting understandings. Populism, for example is defined as a political philosophy "by which a charismatic political leader seeks or exerts government authority based on direct, uninhibited, uninstitutionalized support from vast numbers of generally unorganized followers," (Weyland, 2001).

Another school of thought sees populism as 'communication-style' (Knight, 1998) characterized by 'Manichean logic' ('people' vs. 'elite') and hostile narratives, above all portrayal of crises that feels for the immediate government intervention. The third paradigm, the ideational approach, sees populism as a thin-centered ideology that believes society will eventually be divided into two antagonistic and homogenous groups, 'the corrupt elite, and 'the pure people' the politics should be a representative of 'the people's general will' (Mudde, 2004; Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2012). As a result, populism stands in direct opposition to both elitism and pluralism.

Pappas (2014) suggests populism as a broad word that might serve as a theoretical foundation for our study. He focuses on populism's rhetorical and procedural features in policymaking, as well as majoritarian political reasoning and divisive narratives. This approach

is enhanced by Weyland's (2001) idea of charismatic political leadership and unmediated connection between political leaders and the people.

### 3.1. A Substantive View of Populist Policymaking

Although left- and right-wing populists have opposing views on what constitutes a "good society," they share several policy preferences. They criticize supranational organizations in foreign policy, arguing for the primacy of country states and rejecting liberal globalization. In economic policy, populists frequently blame and penalize the unpopular financial elite and transnational corporations (O'Malley & Fitz Gibbon, 2015). According to (Bartha, Boda, & Szikra, 2020) most often accepted populist policy ideas, on the other hand, are the result of combining populism and nationalism. Right-wing nationalism can be extrapolated from law-and-order retaliatory sanctions in criminal justice policy (Eslen-Ziya & Korkut, 2011).

The claimed widespread substantive mechanism of populist ideas is changeable and temporary as populism spreads across ideologies. While some European academics conflates the thick rightwing nativism with thin ideology of populism (Wodak, 2019), seemingly an inclusionary populism has emerged in Latin America and Mediterranean Europe (Stavrakakis & Katsambekis, 2014). Taggart refers to populism's "empty heart" as a demonstration of its inconsistent core values, implying its inherently "chameleonic" nature (Taggart, 2004). Case Mudde's thin centric ideology approach also acknowledges populism's substantive flexibility, meaning a broad range of populist policy initiatives (Mudde, 2004).

For this study the researchers have borrowed the ideal type of policymaking for both liberal democracies and populist governments from the research article *Politics and Governance*, 2020, Volume 8, Issue 3.

**Table 1.** Ideal type of policy making in liberal democracies.

Policy content	Policy embedded into a relatively coherent system of ideas Central role of mainstream policy paradigms supported by area-specific policy expertise Majoritarian policy preferences constrained by the protection of minority rights Incremental policy changes dominate
Policy process	Constrained by formal and informal institutions Plurality of participating actors in each stage of the policy process Public discussion on proposed policy alternatives
Policy discourse	Limited use of discursive governance Competing discourses and policy frames Dominant policy discourses with high and mainly positive valence

Though the details of policies promoted by left-wing and right-wing populists may differ significantly, several common traits of populist policies might theoretically be identified. Populist political leaders are very sensitive to their electorate's majoritarian desires (Urbinati, 2017). As a result, populist policies disproportionately affect minorities and are antagonistic to unpopular minorities and in some other states policies affect rival political leaders (Pappas T. , 2014).

### **3.2. Features and Procedure of Populist Policymaking**

The possible inconsistency of populism with liberal democracy, and its demand for majoritarian control - a widely accepted theory in academic circles – affect the procedural component of our ideal type (Albertazzi & Mueller, 2013). Charismatic political leaders and their use of "direct, unmediated, uninstitutionalized support" are emphasized in the "populism as political logic" approach.

Populist governments have a history of weakening the rule of law, eliminating checks and balances, and belittling political opposition. (Batory, 2016; Taggart & Kaltwasser, 2016). Both left- and right-wing populist parties are prone to discriminatory legislation (Weyland, 2013), but it is particularly true of exclusionary populist parties (Müller, 2016). However, the Imran Khan PTI's inclusionary populist policies have been heavily condemned for its lawful procedural methods (governing by decrees, appointing just loyal friends). Khan's populism does not necessarily weaken liberal democracy's institutions, although it does tend to skirt around them: his anti-corruption movement, for example, is a major supporter of direct democracy. That is, populists are willing to interact directly with the voters, although to varying degrees and through various ways.

In comparison to the latent policymaking ideal type of democracies, populist policymaking denotes a distinct relationship between governing political actors and other policy actors (Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, 1993). Populists' hostile position toward policy experts who built policy monopolies is fundamental facts, populist and experts of political representation are two distinct modifications of liberal democracies' party-based governments (Caramani, 2017). The decision-making procedure under populist control is primarily different from liberal democracies (Grzymala-Busse, 2011) as a result of excluding veto-players and ignoring expert advice. As a result, policymaking under populist rule tends to move at a much

faster pace and over a shorter period of time, with unpredictable timing and frequent accelerations.

### **3.3. Populist Policy Discourses**

Discourses have a special importance in populist policymaking because they can easily play an influential role in policymaking and policy change (Schmidt, 2008). Approaches like (Walgrave & Jagers, 2007) that view populism as communication style or as a discourse (Aslanidis, 2016) identify strong discursive elements in populist policymaking. While populism theoretically opposed to the institutionalized process of policymaking, it is especially vulnerable to the deployment of rhetorical governance instruments, and frequently employs strategic metaphors to ground and legitimate policy initiatives.

The essential characteristics of the populist policymaking ideal type are summarized in Table 2. We analyze the compliance of an assumed typical case of populist policymaking, post-2018 PTI's, with this ideal type.

### **4.4 PTI's 2018 Election Campaign and Existing style of Policy Discourses**

Representatives of Pakistan's political parties competed for attention in their speeches throughout the 2018 election campaign, which drew substantial media attention and made many slogans for policy reforms. Politics is all about the interaction between the leaders and people. Politicians design rigorous methods to persuade voters to vote for them on Election Day (Hassan, 2020). The policy discussions for the prosperity of nation and political speeches have the potential to build a link between the people and the leader (Peetz, 2021). Along these lines, major political parties of Pakistan and strong contenders for the prime ministership, such as Pakistan Muslim League Nawaz (PMLN), Pakistan People's Party (PPP), Muttahida Majlis Amal (MMA) and Pakistan Tehreek Insaf (PTI) all came up with appealing policy documents, approaches and manifestos to win people's hearts.

The policy debate is always open for all political stakeholders and technocrats because Pakistan is dealing with several issues, including economic decline, energy crisis, public health crises, terrorism, a convoluted foreign policy, including several internal problems. Prior to this election, political parties pledged a variety of policy plans to resolve these issues during previous election campaigns. In the 2018 election, Imran Khan's Pakistan Tehreek Insaf introduced the concept of "accountability of all corrupt politicians" to eliminate traditional politicians and political dynasties; Khan also used Sharia Law arguments to justify women's

rights and minorities' rights, while also continuing to support the maintenance of good connections with other Muslim countries.

#### **4. Analyzing the Ideal Type: Social Policy Reforms in Post-2018 Pakistan**

The Pakistan Tehreek e Insaf government, led by Prime Minister Imran Khan, has been in power since 2018, and it has been the first explicit populist administration in Pakistan, which practically seems moving away from liberal democracy in all sorts of policies whether that is media monitoring policy, national education policy or security/law and order related policy. The ruling party had previously been in power in a Pakistani province for about five years, allowing its policies to crystallize for observers and analysts. Because of these characteristics, the Pakistani situation is particularly well suited to demonstrate the ideal type of populist policymaking that has been constructed through empirically observing populist attitude toward policymaking.

We qualitatively examine the compliance of major national social-policy changes in Pakistan between 2018 and 2022 to the populist policymaking ideal type in an effort to apply our theoretical development to empirical research. National security, education, unemployment programs, and family policies are the four policy areas examined in welfare reforms. We disentangled the content, procedures, and discourses of national social policymaking by following the logic of ideal type constructed by Barth, Boda and Szikra (2021).

##### **4.1. Policy Content**

Post-2018 Pakistan's policymaking mainly constituted paradigmatic changes in substantive terms. The policy of Pakistan Tehreek e Insaf and its domestic performance at this time have been hotly debated. While the opposition parties see it as a period marked by total failures on all fronts, the governing PTI asserts that its historic initiatives have set the country on the route to growth and prosperity, changing the fate of the poor. During the PTI's government, India, a Pakistan's eastern neighbor, unlawfully invaded occupied Kashmir and invalidated Articles 370 and 35-A of its Constitution. The action, which removed occupied Kashmir of its unique status, has angered Kashmiris as well as those who value human rights.

Then, in Pakistan's western neighbor, Afghanistan, the US withdrew its soldiers after 20 years of occupation, paving the way for Taliban authority, the exact elements that the US had invaded to overthrow. Both of these shifts in Pakistan's east and west are significant for different reasons. The PTI government's policy failure is being blamed for the annexation of

occupied Kashmir. Rivals argue – and rightfully so – that India has never dared to take such a step before because it was well aware that doing so in the face of UN Security Council resolutions would provoke a robust response from a nuclear-armed Pakistan.

Essential commodity prices have risen beyond the reach of the average citizen, a single issue that negates the government's accomplishments on all other fronts. Shopkeepers raise prices at will, giving the appearance that the country is without a government. Frequent increases in power and gasoline costs have exacerbated the troubles of the average man, who is uninformed of the 'benefits' of achievements such as GDP growth, increased foreign

**Table 2.** Ideal type of populist policy making.

Policy content	Ideologically multifaceted and diverse Heterodox policy elements with frequent policy innovations challenging mainstream policy paradigms Reflecting majoritarian preferences, hostility against unpopular minorities Radical and paradigmatic policy reforms
Policy process	Circumventing established institutions, downplaying veto players Limiting participation of technocratic policy experts, opposition parties and civil society actors Direct communication with the electorate
Policy discourse	Extensive use of discursive governance Tabloid, highly emotional communication style, recurrent crisis framing Dominance of Manichean discourses

exchange reserves, or the advantages of new dams.

The PTI has long been critical of past governments' armies of ministers, advisers, and special aides. It promised to administer the country with only a few ministers — perhaps as few as 20. It has not, however, been able to uphold its word. Due to political constraints, it seems to have 54 members, including 28 federal ministers, four ministers of state, four prime minister's advisers, and 18 special aides to the prime minister. The number of unelected cabinet ministers has risen to 21. The PTI government has yet to follow through on its promise to turn Lahore's Governor House into a university. In reality, it has withdrawn.

After assuming power, Imran Khan was unable to create an economic policy. Despite his criticism of IMF practices and pledges to avoid it forever, he requested the IMF for financial assistance several times. Khan promised to create jobs, build housing, and reduce poverty, but he was unable to follow through. Instead, deteriorating economic conditions resulted in millions of people losing their jobs. Khan pledged to imprison all "corrupt politicians" such as Zardari and Nawaz Sharif, yet he let NS and Dr. Asim free. Khan's team included dual-citizens, the majority of whom were from the United States.

This disadvantaged his ideological followers, who expressed their concerns freely and behind closed doors without attracting much attention. Non-elected advisers and 'assistants' looked to be making all major decisions at one stage. Imran Khan chose Sardar Usman Buzdar

as Chief Minister of Punjab, despite the fact that he had no prior expertise in leading such a large province that houses half of Pakistan's population! People lost faith in his capacity to bring about any substantial change from the beginning, and stories of his incompetence and corruption began to circulate.

#### **4.2. Policy Making Procedures**

According to the constitution of Pakistan, the executive body of the government, in collaboration with the federal, provincial, and local governments, is responsible for the development of public policy. Currently, especially after the 18<sup>th</sup> amendment this role has now been moved to the provincial government, which can also delegate authority, powers, and resources to local governments. Every elected government has a manifesto on which they influenced the decisions of their voters. It is the responsibility of elected governments to design viable policies to address public issues. In the case of Pakistan, however, the politically elected government has always prioritized personal or party interests over national concerns. Pakistan's 65-year history has revealed a fairly terrible state in terms of policy formulation and implementation. Every government utilized its technocrats for the orchestration of public policy to meet the goals of its manifesto.

After analyzing extensive literature researchers have reached the point that Imran Khan's cabinets avoided formal consultation and consensus-seeking throughout their reforms and policymaking. The PTI's parliamentary supermajority provides a favorable climate for unilateral legislation in a variety of policy domains, as well as the chance to significantly reform the institutional backdrop of policymaking.

Individual moves to propose bills were regularly used to bypass standard parliamentary procedures, such as discussions in parliamentary committees, and therefore speed up the legislative process. The PTI's legislative method effectively curtailed the opposition's ability to control or contribute in decision making. These procedural aspects clearly demonstrate anti-institutional sentiments and a voluntarism decision-making style, limiting policy actors' participation. Nonetheless, with the support of the governmental majority in parliament and the disciplined Pakistan Tehreek e Insaf parliamentary group that upholds all governmental objectives, the effects of policy reforms were codified into legislation. That is, the Imran Khan government's policy-making procedures that willingly or unwillingly established a norm of anti-institutionalism.

### 4.3. Policy Discourses

Unfortunately, the policymaking process in Pakistan is not well-established. Whether we are under the democracy or have a dictatorial government or have populist regime, decision-making is profoundly personal. In first two cases, no doubt the personal or party gains remained important, but this does not negate the existence of institutions, but in populist case policy making observed uninstitutionalized discourses. Sometimes they do exist, but they are limited in their ability to perform at their best (Ghani, 2014).

Historically, Pakistan is observing an entirely different policy making mechanism, especially under populist PTI regime. Since the PTI has a strong parliamentary majority, it can easily pass legislation, PTI portrayed Imran Khan as the leader of the restructuring of the Islamic social agenda, framing social policy changes sometimes in a western and sometimes in an Islamic framework. Imran Khan stated that the government's goal was to create 10 million jobs, and that foreigners would be expected to work in Pakistan. In the Prime Minister's remarks, tax reform proposals were discussed extensively; he gave legitimizing ideas in numerous policy domains where advantages were related to becoming tax payers.

“Imran Khan’s whimsical decision-making is becoming an embarrassment for Pakistan government” (Lodhi, 2021). Pakistani scholars have figured out some of common features of Khan’s policymaking.

#### 5.3.1 U-turns on Decisions

Recent incidents have exposed these tendencies: making a choice without adequate thought or discussion and then reversing it. The newly appointed finance minister, for example, announced that Pakistan will resume commerce with India by purchasing cotton and sugar. Pakistan Prime Minister Imran Khan, who is in charge of commerce, appears to have accepted the move. Imran Khan's cabinet reversed the decision in less than 24 hours. It was followed by a restatement of Pakistan's stance that commerce with India would be impossible unless Delhi reversed its actions in Kashmir on August 5, 2019.

It wasn't the first time a choice with international consequences was made without proper consideration or institutional guidance. An earlier, well-known incident was when the government stated that Pakistan's Prime Minister would attend a Malaysia-hosted summit with Turkey, but then backed out due to strong Saudi concerns. This incident carried foreign policy costs, as was widely observed at the time. U-turns have been considerably more prevalent in remarks made on a variety of other subjects.

### **5.3.2 Revolving Door/Inconsistent Approach**

The propensity of often changing top officials and ministers in a revolving door approach to team members has also grown into a characteristic. The decision to replace Hafeez Sheikh with Hammad Azhar, meant that a third finance minister had been appointed in a very short span of time. Apart from the non-professional way in which this was done – a trademark of this government — Sheikh had just two weeks previously been requested to remain on by the PM when he sought to retire following his Senate election setback.

This was a latest example of government's proclivity for shifting key ministries and top officials on a regular basis. The current Minister of the Interior is the third to be appointed. The current head of the FBR is the sixth in this government's term, while in the Board of Investment four different chairmen have been appointed.

### **5.3.3 Institutions undermined**

Another habit of populist government is its growing lack of trust in institutions, despite its leaders' repeated statements that institutions are being strengthened. This is demonstrated by the manner its ministers retaliated against Pakistan's Election Commission after losing the Islamabad Senate seat in the February by-election. The Prime Minister himself has slammed the electoral authority

The election commission, for its part, reminded government that it was a constitutional and independent body that followed the law, and that "if constitutional institutions continue to be ridiculed in this way, it is tantamount to their (government's) weakness, not the Election Commission of Pakistan's."

The dismissal of the chairman of the Higher Education Commission is another example of the same problem. The chairperson's position was tenured for four years, although the incumbent had only served two. The attack on the autonomy of the Higher Education Commission drew significant condemnation. In a letter to the concerned minister, respected philanthropist, entrepreneur, and driving force behind the creation of the Higher Education Commission, Syed Babar Ali, wrote that education should not be destroyed in this manner and that the Higher Education Commission should be "protected from such machinations."

#### 4.4. Congruence Analysis

By disentangling the three fundamental features of the populist policymaking ideal type, we want to give insights into the way populist policies might be assessed. Table 3 shows the findings of our congruence study, which measured how closely post-2018 Pakistani

Policy making.	Policy content ideologically multifaceted and diverse	++
	Heterodox policy elements with frequent policy innovations	++
	challenging mainstream policy paradigms Reflecting majoritarian preferences, hostility against unpopular minorities	++
	Radical and paradigmatic policy reforms	++
Policy process	Circumventing established institutions, downplaying veto players	-/+
	Limiting participation of technocratic policy experts, opposition parties and civil society actors	++
	Direct communication with the electorate	++
Policy discourse	Extensive use of discursive governance	+
	Tabloid, highly emotional communication style, recurrent crisis framing	++
	Dominance of Manichean discourses	++
Notes: '++': high conformity; '+': moderate conformity; '-': <u>disconformity</u> ; '-/+': inconclusive findings		

policymaking matched the ideal style of populist policymaking. During the congruence study, we looked at whether and how much the normal characteristics of major policy reforms coincide with the parts of the borrowed model.

In three dimensions (as, content, procedure and discourse), Pakistani policymaking under Imran Khan's leadership substantially conformed ideal type of populism, as seen in Table 3. Some characteristics are less prominent: for example, because it has the legislative capacity

to adopt laws, Imran Khan has not depended heavily on discursive governance. A controversial and vague point is institutionalization in policymaking especially after 2018. Pakistan achieved considerable institutionalization by mostly bypassing institutional consultative systems, with several social policy fields codified in the constitution or in cardinal acts.

## 5. Conclusion

Populist political parties have overwhelmingly gained power in South Asia and beyond, providing a unique opportunity to examine how they rule. The major goal of this research was to conceptualize populist administrations' policymaking features. The major portion of ideal type of policymaking we borrowed from the article by Barth, Boda and Szikra (2021), because they have empirically observed populist governments' attitude towards policy making. Secondly, a reasonable portion of ideal type of policymaking we have constructed in the point 'liberal democratic and populist policymaking style, We attempted to recreate the implicit ideal type of policymaking in liberal democracies, in which a variety of actors participate in the policy process. This policymaking ideal type is common in liberal democracies, and it is distinct from the functionalist governance model in a broader sense.

Populist political leaders employed crisis framing and discursive governance strategies like strategic metaphors in Manichean language to rationalize policy measures. The overarching tendency of populist policymaking is direct voter participation and circumvention of existing institutions, policies, and opposing political elites, although more inclusive varieties of populist government tend to follow established democratic norms more.

We attempted to apply policymaking ideal type in empirical study in addition to the research's theoretical goals. For the congruence analysis, we choose an assumed typical method of populist policymaking in post-2018 Pakistan. Our qualitative analysis indicates that the global ideal style of populist policymaking and the selected method are very similar to each other. Imran Khan's social policy reforms were paradigmatic, yet they came from a variety of ideological perspectives. The policymaking process was extremely quick and bypassed traditional established policy mechanisms. The PTI's policy reforms were accompanied by unmediated public consultations and combative, polarized narratives, these factors are entirely uncommon in liberal democracies.

Understanding populist policymaking methods is critical because they have significant practical and theoretical ramifications. It first and primarily discusses how and why populists

have remained in power throughout history. Populist administration's ideological flexibility and chameleonic nature, which closely reflects majoritarian choices of people, might be grounds for its success. Our findings add to the delicate relationship between populist rule and liberal democracy. While populist policy adjustments may be justified by majoritarian preferences, rapid and drastic policy changes ignore institutional and policy expertise control mechanisms and are frequently backed by hostile narratives. On the one hand, these characteristics tend to damage liberal democracy's institutions; on the other hand, they invariably promote social and political polarization. Because of populism's procedural aspects, social groups with little lobbying power may easily be excluded from decision-making, and their views may go unheard. Participatory democracy suffers as a result of this process, as does the quality of policymaking.

There are certain limitations to our research. First, our empirical exercise is just illustrative and not a thorough case study for putting the theoretical notion into practice. Second, while we had the theoretical purpose of constructing a generic ideal kind of populist policymaking in the context of global policymaking views in Pakistan, we only examined its congruence with the Pakistani controlled populist scenario. Further study might justify the value of populist policymaking in empirical analysis and clarify how far this ideal type has to be tweaked to represent the major aspects of populist policymaking in various ideational settings.

We just focused on the policymaking ideal type, which allows next researchers to conduct some studies on particular populist policy specific studies and compare it with liberal democratic policy. If someone wants to work in Pakistani perspective, we observed but did not touch; three main policy paradigms historically remained in practice; dictatorial policy paradigm, liberal democratic policy paradigm and populist policy paradigm.

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