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Article:	**Examining Pre and Post-Elections 2018 Imran Khan's Popularity Frames in Newspapers of Pakistan**
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ABSTRACT

The study examines Imran Khan's Popularity Pre and Post-Elections 2018 Frames in Newspapers of Pakistan. The quantitative content analysis measured the themes used for Imran Khan's popularity in four English and Urdu dailies. The total stories related to frames was 421 (N=421). The main hypothesis: A significant difference exists in framing Imran Khan's popularity Pre and Post-election 2018, tested. The findings revealed that the Charismatic and Anti-Charismatic Frame, chi-square is 0.241, Value of P=0.026, which is substantial. The Dominant Political stances and Unreliable Frame, chi-square is 0.143, Value of P=0.031, that is also substantiated. The Ideological Win and False promises Frame, chi-square is 0.942, Value of P=0.07. The Human Rights Defender and Human Rights Violator Frame, chi-square is 0.141, P=0.07. Khan's third marriage and controversial marriage of IK Frame, chi-square is 0.35, Value of P=0.024. Therefore, the study concludes that a substantial difference exists in the frames of Imran khan's popularity Pre and Post-Election 2018. Hence, hypothesis is supported.

Keywords: Charisma, Human Rights Stance, Ideology, IK Marital Status, Political Standing, Populism.

Introduction

Theoretical Framework

According to Goffman, Framing theory defines frames as "interpretative schemas." Frame reconstruct reality. Individuals cannot make sense of the world around them and thus rely on interpretative schemas to interpret the issue through beliefs, experiences, and knowledge. The use of spin doctors tailors political matters and persons. Various frames are used like stereotypical frames, the frame representing political figures or community, conflict frame, human interest, thematic, episodic, economic and responsibility frames. (1974, p.12).

Tuchman (1978, p.424) defined news as a frame that highlights certain aspects of reality and significant problem, diagnose the causes, draw conclusion and suggest suitable solutions (Entman, 1993, p.424). The frames used as phrases, stereotypes, and images (p.52). Tankard provided eleven framing mechanisms to observe news frames, i.e., "headlines, subheads, images, captions, leads, source, quotes, logos, pull quotes, figures and concluding paragraphs" (2001, p.101). In addition, frames are part of political debates, journalistic norms, and social movement discourse, issue-specific and generic frames (Vreese, 2005, p.54-55). Semetko and Valkenburg presented five generic frames such as "human interest, economic consequences, conflict, morality and responsibility" (1999, p.551).

Iyenger (1991, p.15) argued that episodic coverage leads to individualistic attribution, and thematic frames lead to societal attribution.

Rationale

Populism is a political approach that evolved in the United States during the election campaign of the people's party, also called the Populist Party, in 1892. The word Populism derived from the Latin word populus, which means people. "Us vs. Them" by Kramer (2014, p.22) described Populism as an ideology. Sovereign people, but their sovereignty is compromised by the corrupt elite, and only populist leaders can help them to regain their power (Panizza, 2005, Albertazzi & McDonnell, 2008, p.6). Populism, as a form of political movement and rhetoric, uses an emotional and moralist style that is sometimes aggressive but appealing to common people (Canovan, 1982, p.23).

Research showed that different media strategies were employed by populist leaders to reach a diverse audience. But the existing literature on Populism is in the European context, and a little literature available in the Asian context is based on qualitative research. The study focuses on the Pre and Post-Election campaign and media portrayal of Imran Khan. Scholars identify different populist approaches in the European context, but this study analyzed how those approaches are employed in Populism in Pakistan. As in the study, framing is utilized to examine the various popularity frames within the themes of populist view used in Newspapers of Pakistan, which is an addition to framing theory. This study also expands the existing literature on Populism in Pakistan and will provide secondary data for upcoming scholars.

Literature Review

Populism

According to Mudde, Populism divides society into homogeneous and antagonistic groups; the first is pure, and the second is a corrupt elite class (2004, p.543). Jagers and Walgrave (2007, p.321) define it as a style, and Hawkins described it as a discourse (2010, p.1042). Many and Surel are categorized into the political one as a sovereign individual, second, a cultural and last the economic class (2000, p.123). Populism doesn't have a precise definition (Nilsson, 2018). Mudde and Kaltwasser (2018) explored the inclusionary-left- wing and exclusionary-right-wing versions of Populism. Right-wing populists rely on nativism, and left-wing rely on socialism (p.1669). Taggart defined a populist leader as a most extraordinary person (1990, p.54). Populism is said to appeal to charismatic leaders who consider themselves the "voice of people bypassing the political institutions" (Cannon, 1999, p.23). Bourdieu (1994, p.78) added symbolic dominance to the concept of Charisma. Weber (1947, p.23) defines Charisma as a certain attribute of a person that sets him apart from ordinary people. Hawkins argued that the charismatic notion of Populism is represented by the relationship between citizens and politicians (2010, p.27). Charismatic personalities often lead populist parties. Populist leaders described themselves as the voice of the majority against the elite minority and were regarded as the most authentic and legitimate members of society to pursue people's concerns. Hameleers (2017) defined media populism as a media use of populist style and rhetoric (p.34). Strömbäck and Esser two dimensions, first is personnel promotion of policies and criticizing the opponents. The second is issue-specific message, and character, i.e., person-specific message for publicity (2017, p.25).

Mudde (2004) and Rovira (2017) suggested popular agency approach. Stanley (2008, p.2). Hawkins's (2017, p.514) ideational approach is building discourse between elitism and pluralism. Weyland (2017) identified the strategy used by a charismatic leader who seeks power through direct support from their unorganized followers (P.3). Taggart (2000, p.12) identified populism as effective strategy for crisis. According to Mazzoleni (2008, p.8 & 24), populist actor enforces strategies through movements for public support and media attention.

Neumann and Nicole (2019, Pp.32, 33) determined negativity , emotionality, sociability, and demoralizing the political opponents through scare tactics. Populist communication styles are storytelling frames for media personnel (Kellner, 1990, p.112). During the trump election campaign in 2016, the survey revealed his style and rhetoric appealed the retired service persons of Vietnam (Oliver & Rahn, 2016, p.23). Oliver (1991, p.12) described populism in the context of economic policy as shortest way to success.

Objectives of the Study
1.   To examine the extent of Imran Khan's Coverage by the newspapers Pre and Post-Election 2018.
2.   To examine what themes were used by the selected newspaper regarding Imran Khan's Popularity Pre and Post-Election 2018.

Hypothesis

H1: There is a significant difference exists in the framing of Imran Khan's popularity Pre and Post-election 2018.

H1a: There is a significant difference exists between the frames of Imran Khan's Charisma Pre and Post-election 2018.

H1b: There is a significant difference exists between the frames of Imran Khan's political standing Pre and Post-election 2018.

H1c: There is a significant difference exists between the frames of Imran Khan's ideology Pre and Post-election 2018.

H1d: There is a significant difference exists between frames of Imran Khan's human rights stance Pre and Post-election 2018.

H1e: There is a significant difference exists between frames of Imran Khan's marital status Pre and Post-election 2018.

Research Questions

RQ1: What is the significant difference exists in the frames of Imran Khan's Popularity Pre and Post-Election 2018?

RQ1a: What is the significant difference exists between frames of Imran Khan's Charisma Pre and Post-election 2018?

RQ1b: What is the significant difference exists between frames of Imran Khan's political standings Pre and Post-election 2018?

RQ1c: What is the significant difference exists between frames of Imran Khan's ideology Pre and Post-election 2018?

RQ1d: What is the significant difference exists between frames of Imran Khan's human rights stance Pre and Post-election 2018?

RQ1e: What is the significant difference exists between frames of Imran Khan's marital status Pre and Post-election 2018?

Method

Design of the Study

Quantitative research analyzed the content of Imran Khan's Popularity Frames Pre and Post-Elections 2018 in two English dailies i.e., DAWN and The News International, and two Urdu dailies, Daily Express and Daily Dunya. The popularity of Imran Khan is operationalized in five main themes (Charisma, Dominant political stances, ideology, Human rights stance, and Khan's third marriage). All are divided into positive and negative frames. Charisma is theme divided into Charismatic vs. Anti-charismatic. Dominant political stances have two frames Political Dominance vs. Unreliable. Ideology have two frame i.e., Ideological win vs. False Promises. Human rights stance as Human Rights Defender vs. Human Rights Violator. Khan's third marriage have two frames i.e., Khan's Third Marriage vs. Controversial Marriage of IK.

Urdu and English dailies published in twin cities Islamabad and Rawalpindi are the population of the study.

Sample

Selection of sample is based on high circulation of dailies were Daily Dawn and The News International. Two Urdu newspapers i.e., Daily Dunya and Daily express. The sample was acquired through their websites' archives.

Two time slots were selected; the first is , Pre-election 2018, six months were selected, i.e., 25th February till 25th July 2018, to analyze the thematic frames and extent of coverage given to Imran Khan's populist rhetoric and style. Post-election 2018, time selected after completing 100 days, i.e., 25th November 2018 till 25th April 2019, to analyze the significant difference in the coverage and thematic frames after the electoral victory in 2018. The reason behind selecting this period was to investigate the news coverage during the electoral campaign, and after the completion of 100 days of Imran Khan's government.

The news stories were selected based on a defined content categorization rule. News stories analyzed through SPSS software.

Data Collection and Coding

The news stories were retrieved from the websites of two highly circulated English (Daily Dawn and The News International) and two Urdu (Daily Dunya and Daily Express). A coding sheet was developed, starting from the newspaper's name, date, type of story, news story placement, themes, frames, and number of words. Themes Charisma Dominant political stances, ideology, Human rights stance, and Khan's third marriage.

Results

The total number of stories related to Imran Khan's Popularity in dailies of Pakistan Pre and Post-Election 2018 is 421 (N=421). Most stories are published in the Daily Express, which is 155, and daily Dunya are 143. DAWN published 66 and The News International published total 57. The total number of Pre-Election News Stories published is 226, and Post-Election News stories are 195. The frequency table of news stories covered in Newspapers of Pakistan is given below;

Table 1

Frequency of News stories covered in Press (Pre and Post-Elections)

Press	Frequency (100%)		
	Pre	Post	Total
DAWN	30 (7.1%)	36 (8.6%)	66 (15. 7%)
The News International	30 (7.1%)	27 (6.4%)	57 (13.5%)
Daily Express	87 (20.7%)	68 (16.2%)	155(36.8%)
Daily Dunya	79 (18.7%)	64 (15.2%)	143(34%)

Total	226 (53.6%)	195 (46.4 %)	421 (100%)

Table 1, Frequency of News stories covered Pre and Post-Election in DAWN Pre-Election, news stories published are 30 (7.1%), In The News International, 30 (7.1%) in Daily Express 87 (20.7%), and in Daily Dunya 79 (18.7%).

The numbers of Post-Election News stories are 195. In DAWN, 36 (8.6%), The News International 27 (6.4%), Daily Express 68 (16.2%), and Daily Dunya 68 (15.2%) Post-Election news stories are published.

Table 2

Frequency of Frames (Pre and Post-Elections)

Frames	**Popularity (Frequency (100%)**		
	Pre	**Post**	**Total**
Charisma			
Charismatic frame	15 (3.53%)	10 (2.37%)	25 (5.9%)
Anti-Charismatic	23 (5.46%)	15 (3.56%)	38 (9%)
Political Standing			
Dominant Political Stances	15 (3.56%)	4 (0.94%)	19 (4.5%)
Unreliable	16 (3.8%)	22 (5.2%)	38 (9%)
Ideology			
Ideological Win	112 (26.6%)	67 (15.9%)	179 (42.5%)
False Promises	11 (2.61%)	31 (7.63%)	42 (10%)
Human Rights Stance			
Human Rights Defender	19 (4.51%)	37 (8.78%)	56 (13.3%)
Human Rights Violator	0 (0%)	5 (1.18%)	5 (1.2%)
IK Marital Status			
Khan's Third Marriage	8 (1.9%)	3 (0.71%)	11 (2.6%)
Controversial Marriage of IK	7 (1.66%)	1 (0.23%)	8 (1.9%)
Total	**226 (53.6%)**	**195 (46.4%)**	**421 (100%)**

In table 2, the positive frame, which is charismatic, showed the popularity of Imran Khan is 15 (3.53%) in the Pre-Election and 10 (2.37%) in the Post-Election, in a total of

25 (5.9%). On the other hand, the negative frame, which is the Anti-charismatic frame, is 23 (5.46%) in the Pre-Election and 15(3.56%) in the Post-Election, and in total, 38(9%). The finding reveals that the Anti-Charismatic frame is more dominant than the charismatic one in the pre and Post-Election.

Political standing was the second selected frame. The positive frame, which is the Dominant Political stance frame, is 15 (3.56%) in the Pre-Election and 4 (0.94%) in the Post-Election, a total of 19 (4.5%). The negative frame, which is the Unreliable frame, is 16 (3.8%) in the Pre-Election and 22 (5.2%) in the Post-Elections, a total of 38 (9%). The negative frame, which is Unreliable, is 9% in total. The finding reveals that the unreliable frame is more dominant than the Dominant political stances in the pre and Post-Election.

Ideology was the third selected frame. The positive frame which is Ideological Win showed the popularity of Imran Khan was 112 (26.6%) in the Pre-Election and 67 (15.9%) in the Post-Election, in a total of 179 (42.5%). In contrast, the negative frame, which is the False Promises frame, is 11(2.61%) in the Pre-Election, 31(7.63%) in the Post-Election, and in total, 42(10%). The finding reveals that ideological win is more dominant in the pre and Post-Election.

The fourth selected frame is Human Rights Stance. The positive frame, which is the Human Rights Defender frame is (19, 4.51%) in the Pre-Election and (37, 8.78%) in the Post-Election, in total of 56(13.3%). The negative frame, which is the Human Rights violator frame, is 0(0%0) in the Pre-Election and 5(1.18%) in the Post-Election in total of 5(1.2%). The finding reveals Human Rights Defender is more dominant in the pre and Post-Election.

The fifth and last frame of this study is IK Marital Status. The positive frame which is Khan's third marriage, showed the popularity of Imran Khan is 8 (1.9%) in the Pre-Election and 3(0.71%) in the Post-Election, in a total of 11(2.6%). The negative frame, which is the Controversial marriage of the IK frame, is 7 (1.66%) in the Pre-Election and 1(0.23%) in the Post-Election, 8(1.9%) in total. The finding reveals that Khan's third marriage is more dominant in the pre and Post-Election.

Frames of Popularity of Imran Khan Pre and Post-Election 2018

The popularity of Imran is identified and operationalized under five main themes, i.e., Charisma, Dominant political stances, ideology, Human rights stance, and Khan's third marriage.

Table 4.3

Frames of the popularity of Imran khan (Pre and Post-Elections2018)

Frames	Popularity in Newspapers of Pakistan 2018-19				
	Pre Elect	Post elect	Pearson Chi-Square	df	Asymptotic Significance (2-tailed)
Charisma	38 (8.99%)	25(5.93%)	0.241	1	0.026
Political standing	31 (7.36%)	26 (6.14%)	0.143	1	0.031
Ideology	123(29.2%)	98 (23.53%)	0.242	1	0.026
Human Rights Stance	19 (4.51%)	42 (9.96%)	0.141	1	0.021
IK marital status	15 (3.56%)	4 (0.94%)	0.151	1	0.024

RQ1: What is the significant difference exists in the frames of Imran Khan's Popularity Pre and Post-Election 2018?

H1: There is a significant difference exists in the framing of Imran Khan's popularity Pre and Post-election 2018.
To test the first main hypothesis, the following sub-hypothesis is tested;
RQ1a: What is the significant difference exists between frames of Imran Khan's   Charisma Pre and Post-election 2018?

H1a: There is a significant difference exists between frames of Imran Khan's Charisma Pre and Post the election 2018.

The charismatic frame is 15 (3.53%) in the Pre-Election and 10(2.37%) in the Post-Election in total of 25(5.9%). Anti-charismatic frame 23(5.46%) in the Pre-Election and 15(3.56%) in the Post-Election, and a total of 38(9%). The anti-Charismatic frame is more dominant than the charismatic in the pre and Post-Election.

Thus, the chi-square is 0.241, Value of P=0.026 (Table 4.3), which is significant at the 0.05 level. Hence, the result shows a significant difference exists between frames of Imran Khan's Charisma Pre and Post-election 2018. This indicates that hypothesis **H1a** is supported.

RQ1b: What is the significant difference exists between frames of Imran Khan's political standing Pre and Post-election 2018?

H1b: There is a significant difference exists between frames of Imran Khan's political standing Pre and Post the election 2018.

The Dominant Political stance frame is 15 (3.56%) in the Pre-Election and (4, 0.94%) in the Post-Election in total of 19 (4.5%). Unreliable frame is 16 (3.8%) in the Pre-Election and 22 (5.2%) in the Post-Elections in total 38 (9%). Thus the chi-square is 0.143, Value of P=0.031 (Table 4.3), and it is significant at the 0.05 level. The unreliable frame is more dominant than the Dominant political stances in the pre and Post-Election.

Thus the result shows a significant difference exists between frames of Imran Khan's political standing Pre and Post-election 2018. Therefore, hypothesis H1b is supported.

RQ1c: What is the significant difference exists between frames of Imran Khan's ideology Pre and Post-election 2018?

H1c: There is a significant difference exists between the frames of Imran Khan's ideology Pre and Post-election 2018.

The ideological win frame is 112 (26.6%) in the Pre-Election and 67 (15.9%) in the Post-Election in total of 179(42.5%). False promises frame is 11(2.61%) in the Pre-Election, 31(7.63%) in the Post-Election, and in total, 42(10%). An ideological win is more dominant in the pre and Post-Election.

Thus, the chi-square is 0.242, Value of P=0.026(Table 4.3), which is significant at the 0.05 level. Thus the result shows a significant difference exists between frames of Imran Khan's ideology Pre and Post the election 2018. So, hypothesis H1c is also supported.

RQ1d: What is the significant difference exists between frames of Imran Khan's human rights stance Pre and Post-election 2018?

H1d: There is a significant difference exists between frames of Imran Khan's human rights stance Pre and Post the election 2018.

The Human Rights defender frame is (19, 4.51%) in the Pre-Election and (37, 8.78%) in the Post-Election in total 56(13.3%) Human Rights violation frame is 0(0%) in the Pre-Election and 5(1.18%) in the Post-Election in total 5(1.2%). Human Rights Defender is more dominant in the pre and Post-Election.

Thus, the chi-square is 0.141, Value of P=0.021 (Table 4.3); it is significant at the 0.05 level. Thus the result shows a significant difference exists between frames of Imran Khan's human rights stance Pre and Post-election 2018. So, hypothesis H1d is also supported.

RQ1e: What is the significant difference exists between frames of Imran Khan's marital status Pre and Post-election 2018?

H1e: There is a significant difference exists between frames of Imran Khan's marital status Pre and Post the election 2018.

The Khan's Third Marriage Frame is 8 (1.9%) in the Pre-Election and 3(0.71%) in the Post-Election, a total of 11(2.6%). The controversial marriage of IK Frame is 7 (1.66%) in the Pre-Election and 1(0.23%) in the Post-Election, a total of 8(1.9%). Khan's third marriage is more

dominant in the pre and Post-Election. Thus the chi-square is 0.151, Value of P=0.024 (Table 4.3), and it is significant at the 0.05 level. Thus the result shows a significant difference exists between frames of Imran Khan's marital status Pre and Post the election 2018. So, hypothesis H1e is also supported.

H1: There is a significant difference exists in the framing of Imran Khan's popularity Pre and Post the election 2018.

The main hypothesis, which states that a significant difference exists in the framing of Imran Khan's popularity Pre and Post the election 2018, is supported. As the hypotheses, H1a, H1b, H1c, H1d, and H1e are supported. Hence, the main hypothesis, H1, is also supported.

Discussion

The research, "Examining Pre and Post-Elections 2018 Imran Khan's Popularity Frames in Newspapers of Pakistan," is a quantitative content analysis of four mainstream newspapers, i.e., DAWN, The News International, Daily Express, and Daily Dunya, were sampled to analyze the data in the time period of one year; six months were selected before election 2018 (25th Feb- 25th July), and six months after the completion of 100 days (25th Nov- 25th April) of the newly elected government of Pakistan. The study also examined the significant difference between the thematic frames of Imran khan Pre and Post-Election 2018. Popularity were operationalized through five main themes, i.e., Charisma, Dominant political stances, ideology, Human rights stance, and Khan's third marriage.

In this study, H1 has been tested and found that a significant difference exists between the charismatic and anti-charismatic frames. The analysis revealed the difference between the Charismatic frame (25, 5.9%) and Anti-Charismatic is (38, 9%) of 13 frames (chi-square: 0.241; P=0.026). The finding indicates that the negative frame (anti-charismatic) of Imran khan got more coverage than the positive frame (charismatic frame). Iyenger (1991, P.15) concluded that episodic and thematic coverage leads to an individual attribution which is supported in this study of specific attribution attached in the media coverage of IK–Kaptaan, Khilarri, tsunami, champion, and negative attributions Anarii, Taliban khan. Iyenger's casual responsibility frame and treatment responsibility frame are also supported by the finding of this study.

In the previous research, scholar discuses that charismatic populist discourse gives prominence and add a symbolic value to populist campaign but the finding of H1a shows that populist anti-charismatic discourse also attracts media attention to them and attach importance to their populist motives. However, the charismatic core of Populism is a way to establish a quasi-direct relationship with the audience. The findings also support Mazzoleni's hypothesis that during the established phase, the populist leader loses their charismatic appeal (2008, p.61). In this study, Findings revealed that the negative frame of Imran khan is more popular than the positive frame.

In H1b, results showed that there is a significant difference exists between frames of Imran Khan's political standing Pre and Post the election 2018. The positive frame is the dominant

political stance, and the negative frame is unreliable. The difference between Dominant political standing frame (19, 4.5%) and unreliable frame is (38, 9%) is of 19 frames (chi-square: 0.143; P=0.031). The finding also revealed that the negative frame (Unreliable frame) is more prevalent than the positive frame (Dominant Political Stances). In the Pre-Election time period, dominant political stances have a higher frequency than in the Post-Election. In contrast, the unreliable frame remains dominant in the pre and Post-Election period, which supports the Iyenger argument of responsibility can damage the self-image and leads to accountability and emotional arousal of individuals (1991, p.8-9).

Finding revealed that media merely employ thematic and episodic frames at a macro level, and at the micro levels, combined with the conflict, responsibility, and economic consequences frame that revelation support Scheufele's study that frames operates at macro and micro level (1999, p.12). In 2008 Mazzoleni argued that through staging events and rallies, and acting as watchdog , populist actors gain public support and media coverage. Further, this study also supports the Bonner work, which stated that aggressive and crime rhetoric grabs media attention, called punitive Populism (2021). Moreover, Motif and Tormey, the innocent us vs. culprits narrative grasp greater attraction of media and people. Imran Khan's populist rhetoric of accountability, fairness, and transparency gained greater popularity during his long sit-in. This study revealed that the unreliable frame (Go Imran GO, Corrupt leaders, U-turn) has higher coverage in Newspapers of Pakistan Pre and Post-Election 2018. This study proved that despite dominant political stances, the unreliable frame was prevalent in the news coverage.

In H1c, the study assumes a significant difference exists between frames of Imran Khan's ideology Pre and Post-election 2018. The difference between the Ideological Win frame (179, 42.5%) and the False Promises frame (42, 10%) is 137 frames (chi-square: 0.942; P=0.07). The result showed that the positive frame (Ideological Win) is more dominant than the negative frame (False Promises). In 2008, Stanley argued that thin ideologies are practiced with established ideologies such as nationalism, liberalism, and socialism (p.2 & 14). Stanley's revelation and hypothesis of this study are aligned, which means the ideology frame contains information about housing schemes for the poor, eradication of poverty, youth projects, national curriculum, and corruption-free Pakistan. That is the positive frame. Imran Khan practiced political ideologies with already established ideologies. Mazzoleni also argued that populist actors gain public support and media attention through rallies, staging events, and tactical attacks on media and opponents. This revelation supports the hypothesis of ideological stances, populist actor grasps media attention and popular support. Neuman and Nicole's work also contributes to this study as the discursive frame promotes the visibility, resonance, and legitimacy of populist actors (2019, p.33). The finding showed that media highlight ideological frames which resonate with societal problems.

In H1d, the study presumes that there is a significant difference exists between frames of Imran Khan's human rights stance Pre and Post-election 2018. The difference between Human rights defender frame (56, 13.3%) and human rights violator frame is (5, 1.2%) is of 51 frames (chi-square: 0.141; P=0.021). The result showed that the positive frame (Human Rights Defender) is more dominant than the negative frame (Human Rights Violator). Weyland's study revealed that retrospective analysis of political actors leads to optimistic

support for populist ideas (2003, p.825). Same as that Imran Khan portrayed as human rights defender. Scholars highlight religious Populism in Imran Khan's political campaign and got extensive coverage. (Mulla, 2017, p.4184; Yilmaz and Saleem, 2021, p.4). The results of this study also support the human rights stance (Riyasat-e-Madina and minority right) frame was dominant in Pre and Post-Election coverage. The news regarding the Kartar Pur corridor remains prominent in the press as it emphasizes interfaith harmony.

In H1e, the study presupposes a significant difference exists between frames of Imran Khan's marital status Pre and Post-election 2018. The difference between Khan's third marriage frame (11, 2.6%) and the Controversial marriage of IK (8, 1.9%) is of 3 frames (chi-square: 0.35; P=0.024). Findings revealed the positive frame (Khan's third marriage) is more dominant than the negative frame. As Bennet (1995, p.551) argued, the human interest frame is greatly employed during political news reporting. News reporters add some essence of personalized content to a story to make it newsworthy. Findings show that the news regarding Khan's third marriage remains dominant in Newspapers of Pakistan.

Conclusion

In this study, populist views in Pakistan's context were introduced; Imran khan is the first populist who involves youth and common people through Dharna and his charismatic appeal and Islamist Populism (creating a welfare state). He also grabbed support because of his anti-elite and accountability narrative and substantive economic reforms. Being part of Asia, none of the studies is available in Pakistan's context. This study contributes to Pakistan's context and popularity of the Leader Imran Khan and serves as secondary data for upcoming scholars. This study concluded that the Anti-Charismatic frame is more dominant than the charismatic in the pre and Post-Election. The unreliable frame is more dominant than the Dominant political stances in the pre and Post-Election. The ideological win is more dominant in the pre and Post-Election. Human Rights Defender is more dominant in the pre and Post-Election. Khan's third marriage is more dominant in the pre and Post-Election.

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