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Article:	Weak Writ Areas in Pakistan – Challenge For Internal Security Governance
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ABSTRACT

This article examines the structural governance flaws that have considerably affected the internal security governance in Pakistan. One of the main governance flaws is the possession of areas with poor writ of the government and no formal policing that has seriously affected the lives of citizens of Pakistan. At Pakistan's independence in 1947, several of these areas were inherited, including the seven Federal Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), known as "Agencies" and six frontier regions (FRs). Moreover, Malakand Division with the status as Provincially Administered Tribal Areas (PATA) was an independent state till 1969 when hardline Islamic parties demanded the implementation of Islamic rule and Category "B" areas of Balochistan with weak state writ and the absence of a defined police system. Some weak governed areas like the "Tri-Border Belt" and even portions of Karakoram Highway (KKH) have emerged where criminal elements operated with impunity. The article takes into account first and second-hand sources tracing out the peculiarities of weak writ areas highlighting neglect of successive governments and their effects on Pakistan's internal security especially after the event of 9/11. Spillover of Afghan instability resulted in the use of these areas by terrorists escaping from Afghanistan and the formation of a defunct terrorist movement called Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) which seriously disturbed the fibres of internal stability governance in Pakistan. The article aims to examine the impact of weak governance in Pakistan's Tribal and border regions on internal security and to assess the role of military interventions, a non-preferred option in stabilizing security in these areas. It was only after launching numerous military actions that the situation got relatively stabilized for internal security. There is a need for long-term measures to bring sustainable stability in weak-governed areas of the country.

Key Words: Weak writ areas, FATA, Balochistan, Terrorism, Internal security governance, Taliban, and Military Operations

1. Introduction

Pakistan's internal security mosaic is very complex, the root causes of which are multi-faceted and challenging. One of the major causes identified is a structural governance flaw that has impacted the internal security of Pakistan. Even after 70 years of the creation of Pakistan, many areas remained with weak writ of the government. Pakistan in 1947 inherited most of the "Problematic Frontiers" from the British Raj and had very meagre resources to tackle such type of complex governance issues (Shaman, 2019). Ethnically and culturally, Pakistan has a lot of diversity in the country and several issues remain unresolved. Scholars believe that Pakistan has suffered more from internal threats compared to external ones and the diverse environment prevalent in Pakistan provides sufficient space for centrifugal forces for their anti-state activities against the federation. (Ambreen, 2008). Ishrat opines that Pakistan's internal security dilemma consists of structural flaws and weak governance institutions and points out that democratic governance could be strengthened if the supporting institutions can assert the writ of the state (Ishrat, 2018: p-21). According to International Crisis Group (2009), stated that the legal and administrative structures of the colonial era were not appropriate for modern governance. The lack of accountability and the lack of credible and formalized involvement of multiple stakeholders created governance gaps, allowing unlawful non-state actors to operate freely. In poorly governed areas, weak governmental administrative authorities allowed local militants to establish alternative Taliban-style policing and judicial systems, further contributing to radicalization (Ghani, 2018).

More than seven decades after the creation of Pakistan, the country has been continuing to face challenges in establishing authority across all its regions. Many areas in Pakistan remain ungoverned, highlighting persistent issues in governance and administrative control (Rumi, 2012; Ishrat, 2018). Pakistan has been bearing the impact of weak writ areas in the country where since the inception of the country in 1947, the governance structure remained weak and the governance terms like FATA, Frontier Regions (FRs) and PATA and "Category B" areas remained prevalent in the province of KPK and Balochistan respectively. Some analysts have noted that with the combined effect in the provinces of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK) and Balochistan, weak writ areas comprise nearly 40% of Pakistan's geographical territory (Khaled, 2012; Khosa, 2018). In the last more than two decades, Pakistan has faced the challenging threat of ethno-nationalist violence, sectarian and communal hatred as well terrorism from Islamist militancy especially in the borderland areas contagious to Afghanistan where the writ of the government has remained relatively weak (Salim and Azeem, 2019). Moreover, this study is conducted to examine the impact of weak governance in Pakistan's Tribal and border regions on internal security and to assess the role of military interventions in restoring stability. Furthermore, this study takes into account the peculiarities of various weak writ areas in Pakistan assessing their impact in accentuating the terrorism and violent extremism in the country. The paper also analyses the law enforcement mechanism in weak writ areas and their relative capacity to bring stability to the internal security front of the country.

2. Significance of the study

The article comprehensively covers the details about certain areas where traditionally Pakistan lacked formal writ of the government and policing resulting in the use of these areas by the elements working against the interests of the Pakistani state. Some of these areas like

FATA and Balochistan being contiguous to Afghanistan were also used for the proliferation of terrorism in Pakistan especially after 9/11 when most of the weakly governed spaces were not only used by terrorists leaving Afghanistan but huge societal as well as economic turmoil was experienced in Pakistan. The impact of weak governed areas has been studied on the internal security governance of Pakistan bringing out some prudent and workable recommendations as a way forward.

3. Literature Review

3.1. Erstwhile Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA)

The areas, in which Pakistan's various constitutions have listed as Tribal Areas have been treated historically as a Buffer Zone between the erstwhile British Empire and Czarist Russia's influence (Jehanzeb et al., 2017). Zahid (2011) argues that Pakistan had structural governance weaknesses in certain areas like Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and the Provincially Administered Tribal Areas (PATA) bearing very weak writ of the government. The former FATA comprised seven agencies/ districts, listed from South to North as South Waziristan, North Waziristan, Kurram Agency, Orakzai Agency, Khyber Agency, Mohmand Agency, Bajaur Agency, along with six Frontier Regions (FRs) known as: Frontier Region Tank (FRT), Frontier Region Dera Ismail Khan (FRDIK), Frontier Region Lakki Marwat (FRLM), Frontier Region Bannu (FRB), Frontier Region Kohat (FRK), and Frontier Region Peshawar (FRP) (Khan 2010, p. 63).

With tribal connections extending across the western border into Eastern Afghanistan, the region is home to approximately 4.5 million people, primarily from Pashtun tribes. Since Pakistan's independence in 1947, successive governments have been criticized for neglecting the tribal areas, failing to improve living standards or provide basic services to the general public. This neglect has led to widespread unemployment and illiteracy, sparked instability and encouraged racism and conservatism. Around 60% of the population lives below the national poverty line, with a per capita income of \$500. While the national literacy rate stands at 56%, literacy in the region is alarming low of 17.42% (Saeeda and Alqama, 2012). FATA is the Poorest region in Pakistan, with nearly half of its population living below the poverty line.

Human Rights Commission, commenting on weakly writ areas of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK) province, noted that the Great Britain colonial administration did not establish proper governance institutions in the tribal region. Instead, it relied on a combination of traditional systems like Jirgas (local tribal Councils) and centralized control enforced through the controversial Frontier Crimes Regulations (FCR) of 1901. The provisions of FCR were fundamentally incompatible with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the constitution of Pakistan. Which gave tribal councils broad authority to punish criminals and included the right of convicted individuals to appeal jirga verdicts (though a commission may review a case). Although the FCR did establish a code of conduct for jirgas, the latter have operated outside of these rules and rendered decisions that the FCR has not authorized due to their adherence to rigid tribal customs. Furthermore, because it gave the government the authority to bar FATA inhabitants from entering the rest of Pakistan, this legal structure promoted discriminatory behaviours against the indigenous population (HRCP, 2005).

Yousafzai (2001) termed FCR as a notorious British colonial law for its repressive features against the people of FATA. It empowered the government to arrest anyone, without specifying crime and permitted the imposition of "collective punishment" of family or tribe for

crimes committed by individuals. Some scholars add that punishment could be meted out by unelected tribal jirgas, whose members (called the Maliks) were mostly nominated by centrally appointed political agents (Rehman, 2002). The government's neglect in extending the educational facilities to the FATA areas resulted in the mushrooming of religious seminaries (called madrassahs) offering boarding/lodging facilities to the children of poor and downtrodden. Government neglect proved as one of the major causes of the proliferation of terrorism in these areas. Due to the lack of socio-economic development in FATA, unemployed youth become vulnerable to recruitment by militant groups following the American invasion of Afghanistan. The public especially youth found themselves caught between military operations and militant organizations (Rumi, 2012). Although since 2018, the Pakistani government has attempted to declare FATA agency areas as merged settled districts of KPK province, however, it would take considerable time to establish of formal writ and development of civic facilities.

3.2. Provincially Administered Tribal Areas (PATA)

Again, a colonial legacy, these areas are located in Malakand Division in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Province comprising areas of Dir, Swat and Chitral. Till 1969, they were independent states with separate governance systems with a strong influence of hardline Islam in the area due to lack of formal educational facilities (Lubna and Naveed, 2010: p-89). Mullahs (dogmatic religious leaders) remained an important segment of these states with strong vibes of the Wahaabi version of Islam. Malakand Division was merged into Pakistan in 1969 and was given the status of PATA. Lots of people from PATA especially the students of religious seminaries (madrassas) participated in US-sponsored Afghan jihad against Russia. After the Russian defeat, due to weak writ, the area became infested with Afghan returned “Mujahideen” and the people started demanding implementation of Shariah or the Islamic version of governance through a party called TNSM (Tehreek-e-Nifaz-e-Shariat-e-Muhammadi) under Sufi Muhammad, a veteran of Afghan jihad (Kiran and Chawla, 2019). Insurgency and anti-state activities developed in Malakand Division, whereas despite knowing about it, the state apparatus did not pay much attention to it and undertook half-hearted measures rather than going for an all-out remedy of the situation (Kiran and Chawla, 2019). An extreme version of religious fanaticism remained prevalent in Malakand Division (also given the status of Provincially Administered Tribal Area (PATA) where the writ of the government also remained traditionally weak (Lubna and Naveed, 2010).

3.3. Simmering Balochistan

Balochistan was remote and backwards even before Pakistan gained its independence. After colonizing the subcontinent, the British divided parts of Balochistan to facilitate administrative control. They also attempted to keep the allegiance of Baloch tribes by giving tribal chiefs subsidies and a certain amount of autonomy, provided that they complied with imperial orders (Rumi 2012). Despite having its first elected administration in 1972, Balochistan was not granted the status of a province with a government answerable to an elected legislature after Pakistan gained its independence. It was a Chief Commissioner's province, and the central government in Karachi was represented by its chief executive, the Agent to the Governor General (AGG) (Saleem, Umbreen and Goraya 2012). In the case of Balochistan, the political violence along with terrorist and militant attacks started immediately after the independence of Pakistan as a few fiercely independent tribes expressed reservations

and threatened resistance against the annexation with Pakistan taking up arms and initiating nationalist militant movements (Samad, 2014). There is a significant insurgency going on in Balochistan since 2007. Several nationalist militant groups have been operating in the province, amongst them the Baloch Liberation Army and, the Baloch Republican Army carry on with deep feelings of deprivation and hate against the remaining country, especially the Punjab province. These organizations have been even launching attacks against security forces with impunity (Shoaib, 2014).

Though area-wise, Balochistan happens to be the biggest province of the country government policy weaknesses have haunted it for a long. Areas with a weak writ of the government have existed in this sensitive province. Although it occupies 43% of Pakistan's land, the largest province, Balochistan, is home to only 6% of the nation's inhabitants. According to Ishrat (2018), despite having abundant mineral and energy resources, it is Pakistan's least developed province. With Iran to the west and Afghanistan to the north, the province enjoys a strategic location. It is situated along communication routes to Central, South West, and South Asia. Although 36 percent of Pakistan's gas production and 40 percent of its energy needs are met by the province of Balochistan, 46.6% of its households lack power. The region is riddled with turmoil, with the Baloch nationalists and the Pakistani authorities engaged in a separatist battle. (Rumi, 2012: p-8).

From the governance point of view, Balochistan remained a victim of serious state neglect. Fida (2019) highlights that till the first decade of the 2000s, about 94% of Balochistan province was category “B” areas where the police had no writ and the policing role was given to the levies, an informal local militia recruited through the local tribal chieftains, through a mix of tribal norms and quasi-official procedures and their prime affiliation remained with the tribal chiefs being the paymasters. (Rumi, 2012; Fida, 2019). As per Balochistan Bureau of Statistics data, only five percent of the provincial territory is governed by formal policing. Abbas (2010) argues that post 9/11, in the erstwhile FATA and adjacent areas of KPK and Balochistan with a weak writ of government coupled with weak capacity of civil law enforcement helped militant terrorist organizations to expand their area of influence in the region.

The ethnic-nationalist violence in Balochistan province remained more prominent. These militant groups even in the garb of labelling non-Baloch as “Punjabi settlers” attacked the government officials, security forces, professors, teachers, doctors and other professionals of educated class in the province were also targeted by these groups. To quell the insurgencies, the central government launched military operations not only against the militant outfits which were creating disturbance but also booked the peaceful ethno-nationalist political leaders of Balochistan (Samad, 2014). In addition to separatist movements in Balochistan, even sectarian issues pop up where the Shia community especially the Hazara community living in Quetta, the provincial capital is often ruthlessly targeted and their businesses severely damaged (Zaman, Ghutai and Kaneez, 2012).

3.4. Tri-Border Belt Areas

Comprise huge area of dry riverine spans of River Indus (called “kaccha” area in local language) falling in the jurisdiction of three provinces bordering Punjab, Sind and Balochistan. Only in South Punjab, the kacha (riverine) area is spread over 15,000 square kilometres on both sides of the Indus River (Nizamani, 2023). Due to administrative and policing neglect, all three


provinces have less ownership with negligible presence of law enforcement. Though these areas are not inherited as a colonial legacy due to serious administrative overlook, the area remains encroached by anti-state and criminal elements who retain the liberty to move to any of the provinces with impunity. The tri-border belt borders South Punjab which is a hotbed of sectarian extremism and impunity on movement and unchecked movement to either of the provinces is a sure recipe for trouble (Rumi, 2012; p-18). The fugitives and criminal elements have remained active in these areas duly patronized by the influential local tribal chiefs of Sind, Balochistan and South Punjab. The criminal gangs mostly abduct the locals and at times, even the law enforcement personnel to press for ransom and other demands. The infamous “Chottu gang” operating in Rajanpur (South Punjab) is a case in point for which a full-fledged military operation had to be launched (Asif, 2021). During these operations, even traces of terrorists belonging to TTP and separatist nationalists from Balochistan were found in these areas (Shahzad, 2023).

3.5 Karakoram Highway

Approximately 806 kilometres long strategic highway runs through Punjab province and connects areas of northern Pakistan, Gilgit Baltistan with Xingiang province of China. Though called the “Eighth wonder of the world”, the road runs through some of the rugged and most difficult terrains. The road remains problematic due to terror-related incidents, especially in rough areas bordering the Indus River closer to the districts of Kohistan and Diamer. Islamists from outside Gilgit Baltistan signed off on several terror-related incidents involving commuters on the Karakoram Highway and Babusar Pass in an attempt to incite sectarian strife and gain access to this strategically significant region. (Izhar, 2013). Gilgit is a Shia-dominated area and KKH runs through some of the hardcore Sunni-dominated areas of Kohistan and Chilas. Several terrorist and sectarian-related incidents happened on the Karakoram Highway in which passengers of buses were targeted (Peer, 2013; Nagri, 2023). Since the road is also a strategic trade link between Pakistan and China, KKH is strategically important for the game-changer China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) and anti-Pakistan elements have attacked parts of KKH to create a fear factor (Adnan, 2023) to force China to reduce signatures and recoil from CPEC.

3.6 Policy Evaluating Model.

Several scholars have suggested interesting models to analyze the impact of policies including Meter and Horn (1975), Edward’s Administrative Influence Model (1980) and Walt and Gilson’s policy triangle model (1994). The last model has been selected to assess the policy of keeping the weak writ areas in the country and its impact on internal security governance in Pakistan. A brief salient of the selected model is appended below:



Though the model was initially conceived to assess health policies it had relevance for analyzing other policies as well (Mubarok and Zauhar, 2020). The triangle is noted for its emphasis on four critical dimensions pertinent to policy discussion: content, context, process, and actors. Scholars believe that the top-tiered variable, analyzing the context in which policies are crafted and evaluating how these contextual aspects might affect policy outcomes is essential and figures out to be the major variable on which the remaining variable factors namely actors, content and processes remain largely dependent (Nagurno, 2012).

4. Methodology

The article takes into account the qualitative methodology approach, making use of primary and secondary sources to trace out the peculiarities of weak writ areas, highlighting the neglect of successive governments and their effects on Pakistan's internal security especially after the event of 9/11. This approach allows for an in-depth exploration of complex phenomena, capturing the nuances of socio-political dynamics often overlooked in qualitative analysis. By prioritizing contextual richness, qualitative methods provide a holistic lens to evaluate intricate policy failure. Walt and Gilson's Policy Triangle Model (1994) has been used to ascertain how the interplay between different elements: context, actors, content, and process brings out the policy outcomes.

5. Conceptual Framework

Through a comprehensive literature review, the dynamics of weak writ areas in Pakistan have been ascertained. Interplay between four elements of the Walt and Gilson Policy Triangle Model (1994), context, actors, content, and process has been studied in detail that have affected the policy of keeping these areas with poor writ. Special emphasis has been given to studying the effect of environmental context (analysis of both internal as well as external factors) that has affected the other modular variables of actors, content and processes thus affecting the policy outcomes which in this case is continuously having poorly governed areas in the country.

6. Discussion

In the discussion, the variable of context (internal and external actors) of the poorly governed areas has been discussed in detail that has impacted the internal security canvas of the country.

6.1 External Factors

6.1.1 Afghan Instability Factor

Since the majority of weak writ areas of Pakistan are situated close to Afghanistan, the Afghan factor is important to understand the internal instability in Pakistan. In the historical context, both Pakistan and Afghanistan remained involved in the internal politics of each other since 1947. Despite cultural and religious affinity, Afghanistan was the first country that opposed Pakistan's admission to the United Nations. Moreover, Afghanistan also had reservations over the Pak-Afghan border called the Durand Line, terming it as illegitimate and laying territorial claims inside Pakistan on entire Pashtun areas in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province (Asif and Azeem, 2019). Russian invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 and US support of "global jihad" changed the dynamics of the region in general and Pakistan in particular. As per Coll, with U.S provision of training and strategic intelligence, funding provided by the Saudis, provision of human resources by Afghans as Mujahedeen (holy warriors) and Pakistan extending its territory for guerrilla warfare operations bases made recruitment of jihadi youth through madrassahs to fight communist Russia (Coll, 2004). In the late 1970s, Islamization

policy was adopted by Pakistan's state in support of US sponsored war against communism. Due to porous and open western borders, FATA-based "Mujahidin" had easy access to Afghanistan and clerics or "mullahs" had a significant influence on socio-economic activities in the region. Later on, in the early 1990s, the same group became a movement called Taliban (religious seminary students) and exerted to extend their religious influence in the region through the use of force and terrorism (Kerr, 2010). With such developments, Pakistan's domestic fibers were also severely affected by the introduction of radicalization, extremism and the free flow of weapons (Zahab and Roy, 2004).

6.1.2 Impact of Terrorism; A Regional Phenomenon

Terrorism is an international phenomenon transgressing the national borders. Manifestation has been seen in the environment shaped by the event of 9/11 in the poorly governed areas of Pakistan (Ishrat, 2018). Pakistan suffered a huge impact in the form of human and material casualties in its weak governed areas. In the impact of terrorism on Pakistan especially after 9/11, human cost is the most obvious and saddening. In one of the reports submitted to the Pakistani Supreme Court, it was mentioned that Pakistan suffered 49,000 lives from 2001 to 2013 (Nadia, 2013). The enormity of human losses has been depicted in the following statistics as well. It is worth mentioning that the severity occurred after 2006 with an almost triple surge in not only the number of attacks but also the casualties (both killed and injured). Linkages of most of the terrorist incidents originated from FATA areas, providing safe havens to terrorists as mentioned in Table 1:

Table 1.

Year	Number of Terrorist Attacks	Killed	Injured
2002	56	102	311
2003	88	189	168
2004	159	863	412
2005	254	216	571
2006	675	907	1,543
2007	1,503	3,448	5,353
2008	2,577	7,997	9,670
2009	3,816	12,632	12,815
2010	3,393	10,003	10,283
2011	2,985	7,107	6,736
2012	2,217	5,047	5,688
2013	911	4,160	3,794
Total	18,634	52,671	57,344

Source: Ministry of Interior archives and Security Reports of Pakistan Institute of Policy Studies

One of the most horrific incidents related to terrorism was a massacre of innocent schoolchildren in the Army Public School in Peshawar on 16 December 2014. The incident involved local as well as foreign terrorists mostly Afghans who killed around 140 people mostly school children. Though it was a very tragic and sad incident it provided the Pakistani nation an opportunity to galvanize against terror. Civil society and academia violently reacted

to this gruesome event bitterly criticizing the government to take practical measures against the menace of terrorism in the country. Comments offered by civil society in national media are important to understand the trauma. While terming the incident as heart-breaking and highly traumatic, Zahid stressed the need for self-reflection and soul-searching and highlighted that from 2007-2013, terror incidents in Pakistan arose to 13198 incidents (Zahid, 2014) while Najam commented on apprehensions of parents fearing that any school in any city could become the target of next attack. Civil society demands and supports actions to curb terrorist and extremist elements in our midst (Najmuddin, 2014). Khattak commented that successive governments in Pakistan failed so often in protecting citizens with the latest manifestation obvious in APS Peshawar depicting that terrorists were far from beaten and retained the capacity to inflict large-scale damage at the place of their own choice (Khattak, 2014).

Moreover, the economic cost of terrorism also remained enormous for the country. It is challenging to pinpoint the precise cost of the war on terrorism, but the Ministry of Finance's annual Economic Survey for 2010–2011 estimated that Pakistan had spent nearly \$68 billion in direct and indirect costs over the previous ten years (2001–2011). (Economic Survey Report, 2011). Some scholars relate the fallout of some international and regional events of significance like the Islamic Revolution in Iran and US-sponsored Afghan jihad against communism with President Zia's support proliferated Pakistan with sectarian-based religious seminaries and the creation of madrassah students called Taliban, also played their role in promoting religious extremism (Afzal et al., 2012; Malik and Zhilong, 2019). General Zia-ul-Haq, according to Qazi, stepped up his efforts to Islamize Pakistan and back Islamist insurgents in Afghanistan. Pakistan received billions of dollars in secret American aid for more than ten years to arm and train different Afghan forces to combat the Soviet army. (Qazi, 2013). During the Afghan jihad against communist Russia, massive funding was given to religious seminaries especially in the weak writ areas of the country like FATA and PATA for promotion of extremist sentiments and recruitment of youth to fight against communist Russia. After the Russian defeat, most of these fighters became jobless. Many of them tried to find a vent towards Indian-occupied Kashmir but a large number of them established sectarian groups in Pakistan including Tehreek-e-Taliban-Pakistan (TTP) in FATA thus giving rise to religious extremism (Umbreen, 2008; Kiran and Chawla, 2019).

6.2 Internal Environment

6.2.1 Spread of Sectarian Extremism

Scholars relate that one of the worst impacts of the weak writ areas coupled with the Afghan factor and terrorism on Pakistani society has been the proliferation of sectarian-based religious intolerance among the Pakistani populace. People have taken the law into their hands, and possession of illegal and lethal weapons has become common, thus adding to the challenges of internal security governance (Nadia, 2013). As per a senior journalist, the presence of loose administrative structures, coupled with poverty and prevalent inequality in the society, terrorism and radicalization proliferated in the weak writ areas of the country. When the Tehrik-e-Nifaz-e-Fiqah Jafaria (TNFJ) was established in 1979, it gave the Shias in Pakistan a forum to voice their political opinions. Bhattachariya remarks that because of the enormous sums of money received from the Middle Eastern nations in the guise of Afghan aid, the US-funded Afghan War to stop the Soviets also gave a new push to the sectarian struggle within Pakistan. These monies were mostly utilized to support different sectarian endeavours

(Bhattachariya, 2018). Madrassas and religious seminaries acted as catalysts in spreading the myopic message of hate based on vested interests which gave rise to intolerance and extremist agendas (Ziauddin, 2017). Tehrik-e-Nifaz-e-Shariat-e-Muhammadi (TNSM), a hardline religious party was founded in Malakand (PATA) by a cleric Sufi Muhammad in 1989, playing with the sensitive popular narrative of providing speedy justice to the populace by enforcing Shariah. His narrative was supported by veterans of Afghan jihad (fought against Russia) and in 1994, a local insurgency was experienced in Malakand when locals wanted shariah implementation for speedy justice (Kiran and Chawla, 2019).

The menace of violent extremism was even pointed out by the late Pakistani Prime Minister in her book terming the increased influence of extremist elements in tribal areas of Pakistan including Swat in 2008 with the notional potential of taking over the capital of the country (Bhutto, 2008). Sectarian conflict between Shias and Sunnis has also taken its toll in Pakistan. The largest number of sectarian attacks have taken place in Balochistan and Punjab. In most of the sectarian incidents, Shias have been targeted in Pakistan by the local affiliates of Al Qaeda including Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ) and Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) when the two groups converged operationally to declare a war against Shias in 2012 (Nadia, 2013). This convergence has resulted in the worst attacks to date against Shias, especially against the Hazara community in Balochistan. As per 2012 estimates, 213 attacks took place against the Shia community in which 563 people lost their lives (Nadia, 2013). Even there have been violent factions amongst the Sunni sect where the worship places were targeted. The hardliner Deobandis, the madrassa students mostly from FATA and remote areas of KPK forming Taliban group launched around 70 attacks on shrines killing hundreds of Barelvis (Sunni faction that gives extra respect to sufi shrines) from 2005-2010 and some of the local influential leaders who stood against Taliban were also killed by Deobandis (Huma, 2012: p-4).

6.2.2 Challenge of Law-and-Order Maintenance.

There is no formal police force available in the weak writ areas. The para-military or Civil Armed Forces have been performing the maintenance of law and order in FATA and Balochistan. Pakistan has para-military forces called Frontier Corps, guarding the western borders and Rangers, guarding the eastern borders, operating with the tasks of running primarily border surveillance duties including anti-smuggling duties. Rashid (2009) mentions that even the second-tiered civil law enforcement force Frontier Corps (FC) which operates in both the western provinces of KPK and Balochistan, had poor training and weak capacity to deliver in counter-terrorism operations. In 1973, the force was split into two groups FC NWFP and FC Balochistan to guard more than 2500 kilometers of highly inhospitable terrain of western borders (Abbas, 2007). Presently, both components fall under the Federal Ministry of Interior with the lien of employment with the provincial governments. Though a self-governing institution, the Frontier Corps is equipped with old vintage weapons and communication equipment which undermined its counter-terror efforts (Dilawar, 2008), especially after 9/11 when a large number of high-profile Al Qaeda members escaped from Afghanistan and took refuge in weak writ FATA areas.

Due to limitations of capacity and related factors, civil law enforcement mechanisms remained weak in Pakistan resulting in asking the military institution especially the Army to take the lead role in national counter-terrorism efforts. Due to inconsistent policies, the police institution remained weak and neglected and the vacuum then for controlling internal stability

had to be filled by the military establishment, especially in the counter-terrorism domain (Khosa, 2017). Comparing the credibility of the Army versus the Police, in one of the reports of the Pakistan Institute of Legislative Development and Transparency, in the institutional performance poll, 76 percent of opinion ratings went to the Army institution compared with 18 percent received by police (PILDAT report 2016). As per the Constitution of Pakistan, Functions of Armed Forces - Articles 245 (1), the military remains the third-tiered responders for maintaining law and order and internal security duties including counter-terrorism operations –under the direction of the Federal Government to defend Pakistan.

6.2.3 Compulsion of Keeping Military in the Lead

Though under compulsion due to capacity issues of civil law enforcement agencies, a policy of using the military in the lead role on internal security got diverse responses from scholars (Pakistani as well as international). Military usage on internal security is not a preferred option as the Army is not very well trained in policing roles. One of the drawbacks of using the military on internal security stems from the inherently destructive nature of military force. The use of military force may become excessive including collateral damage and the loss of innocent lives which can alienate civilian populations (Pillar, 2008). The military's dominance in managing the nation's internal security affairs has been criticized by critics such as Christine Fair (2012), who contend that while internal security governance in Pakistan is becoming a higher priority for its citizens, real progress in this area will need the military to relinquish its position and for civilian institutions to take the lead. Umbreen (2016) states that since 2002, Pakistan's armed forces have undertaken comprehensive operations against terrorism in Waziristan Agency in FATA, having an extremely inhospitable environment for armed operations. Pakistan Army undertook many anti-terrorism military operations; important ones have been as follows:

- Operation Al-Mizan (FATA 2002-06),
- Operation Kalosha (South Waziristan Agency, 2004),
- Operation Zalzala (South Waziristan Agency 2008),
- Operation Sher Dil (Bajaur 2007),
- Operation Rah-e-Raast (Malakand 2006-07),
- Operation Rah-e- Haq (Swat 2007)
- Operation Rah-e-Nijat (South Waziristan Agency 2009-10),
- Operation Zab-e-Azb (North Waziristan Agency),
- Operation Radd-ul-Fassad (launched against sleeper cells operating in FATA and Balochistan, 2016)
- Operation Zarb-e-Ahan (launched against criminal elements in tri-border belt “Kacha” areas of South Punjab, 2016).

Moreover, the first National Internal Security Policy 2014-18 was formulated under the civilian setup which investigated causes of internal security turmoil and proposed comprehensive recommendations to tackle the threats (Irfan, 2017; Ghani 2018) with the first objective to establish the writ of the state in relatively ungoverned areas (NISP 2014-18 Policy Document, Ministry of Interior).

7. Conclusions and Recommendations

The study concludes that the major variable of contextual factors, both internal as well as external factors have seriously impacted the other variables of the stakeholders (actors), the content and processes prevailing in weakly governed spaces of the country. Pakistan has suffered tremendously due to the presence of considerably weak governed areas coupled with weak law enforcement structures, especially civil policing. Though external factors of unstable Afghanistan and the menace of terrorism with regional and international linkages have been impacting the exploitation of Pakistan's weak governed spaces, it is the internal policy weakness, neglect of successive governments of not extending its formal writ in these areas or taking measures for the protection of citizens in these neglected areas that have resulted into a spread of terrorism and use of safe havens by the unwanted anti-state elements. Leaving aside the bordering areas of FATA and Balochistan, even in the heart of the country, the presence of tri-border belt areas and ungoverned areas of the Karakoram Highway are unacceptable in modern-day governance principles. Due to weak civil law enforcement capacity, the government remained dependent mostly on military instruments to maintain law and order in these troubled areas particularly to control the menace of terrorism. The civilian government's reliance on the army to maintain internal security can be reduced by maintaining robust and effective civilian security forces. Increasing the police's institutional capabilities will boost the legitimacy of the government and improve security management efficiency (Grare, 2014). Policy reforms have to be brought in civil security capacity building and early merger of weak writ areas in the mainstream fold, as only this will help in the restoration of confidence of citizens of Pakistan and will increase the legitimacy of political government in controlling the weak governed spaces in the country.

The debate clearly shows that in the case of Pakistan, weak policies to manage the internal security challenges remained a major source of concern affected and often accentuated by external factors, especially the regional security situation especially in terms of terrorism. Scholars strongly believe that this complexity determines the need for an effective long-term national internal security policy, which has to be enforced as a state making use of both military and non-military institutions (Zain, He Zhilong & Fatima, 2020). Following are some of the measures to improve the governance in weak writ areas of the country:

- **Merger of Weak Governed Areas in National Mainstream.** Though FATA has been given the status of settled districts but administration is still weak and wanting. There is a need for that pro-active approach should be adopted by provincial administrations both in FATA as well Balochistan "Category B" areas to exert their formal writ in the provinces. The criminal judicial system should be made more effective by improving policing and extending courts for the provision of justice at the grassroots level. Moreover, political activity should be started in these areas with comprehensive improvement in the standard of living of the local populace providing them with job opportunities so that the population especially the youth should not get attracted towards terrorism.
- **Implementation of National Internal Security Policy.** Pakistan's policymakers will need to harness both civilian and military institutions through an effective policy framework to ensure internal security governance in weakly governed spaces (Rumi, 2015). The strategic security calculus of Pakistan demands a prudent and vibrant internal security doctrine and its explicit manifestation in national internal security policies (Ayaz, 2019). The National Internal

Security Policy issued in 2014 and modified in 2018 have to be implemented in true letter and spirit.

- **Adopting Whole of Nation Approach.** All state institutions and civil society have to be taken on board to address the complex issue of improving the weak governed areas. The forums of Apex Committees at national and provincial levels (formed after the gruesome incident of the Army Public School massacre of 2014) have to be made more effective for timely response. Emphasis has to be placed not only on the use of force or undertaking high-intensity kinetic operations to reduce terrorism and violence but also on addressing the root causes in non-kinetic domains for sustained policy implementation.

- **Capacity Building of Civil Law Enforcement.** To overcome governance challenges in affected areas, two key areas will need focus of attention; capacity building of police along with improvement of intelligence networks at various tiers. Police have to be well trained (both for the maintenance of law and order as well as counter-terrorism tasks) and duly integrated with a potent intelligence network for the protection of citizens on a sustained basis. Since law and order and the handling of police a provincial subjects,

- **Better Inter-Provincial Coordination.** There is a need for better coordination amongst the provinces and the law enforcement actors operating at the federal level including the Armed Forces through an Inter-Provincial coordinating mechanism and the Council of Common Interests has to be made more frequent particularly to manage the security situation of tri-border belt areas and Karakoram Highway where responsibility of more than one province is involved.

- **Comprehensive Intelligence Network.** The intelligence gathering has to be made more effective in weak governed areas to ensure early warning for misuse of these areas by terrorists or anti-state elements. In case of effective early warning, government agencies should be able to launch effective counter-terrorist operations for better security of the citizens. For counter-terrorism capacity building, a model of intelligence-based operations has to be developed particularly in weak governed areas of Pakistan integrating human as well as technical intelligence.

- **Reducing Military Signatures in Affected Areas.** Military signatures have to be reduced by effective policing and proactive civil law enforcement. Merged districts of FATA and category B areas of Balochistan will have to be brought into the main folds of governance for which provincial civil administrations will have to play a pro-active role coupled with improving the living standards of the local populace. The local-level judiciary also has to exert more if we wish to rid FATA of the ills of Frontier Crimes Regulations in the earlier timeframe.

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